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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose or the study.-- This study is concerned 
with an analysis or the veto power or the Massachusetts 
. -~overnor. 
The purposes or the study are: 
1. To determine the legal interpretation or the 
use or the veto; 
2. To determine the governor's interpretation of 
the use or the veto; 
3. To acknowledge the rorces responsible ror the 
above interpretations. 
As one aspect or the operation or the system or 
checks and balances, the veto power provi~es an index 
of the extent or executive control within the state. 
Because it has taken a leading role in the development 
or such power, Massachusetts becomes an ideal object ror 
such a study. The predominance or one party-- the 
Republican Party-- in Massachusetts government also makes 
it possible to observe the operation or the veto power 
when the majority or the legislature is or the same 
political party as that or the governor. 
Methods and scope or the study.-- In ascertaining 
the use or the veto power, the writer has utilized 
histD~ical as well as statistical methods. Throughout 
the study, use has been made of the significance of social 
and political factors in the development of the veto power; 
when data concerning the actual number of vetoes and bills 
passed became available, the statistical approach was 
employed. 
In order to determine the legal interpretation of the 
use of the veto, Chapter II has been devoted to a historical 
account of the development of the veto thro~gh the grants 
in colonial charters and the provisions of constitutional 
government. 
The historical pattern is enlarged upon in Chapte~ III 
by an analysis of the veto power during the colonial period. 
·Treatment is given of the influence of the Crown in 
interpreting the veto with emphasis upon the attempts by 
the colonial governors to incorporate Crown interests with 
colonial interests. Chapter IV presents an analysis of 
the veto power beginning with Constitutional government 
in 1780. A numerical count and classification of vetoes 
is undertaken with emphasis upon the volume of legislation, 
party politics, and the governor's reasons for veto. In 
Chapter v~ such analysis is continued from 1860 until 
1952 with acknowledgements of constitutional changes and 
social conditions which have modified the use of the veto 
power in Massachusetts. 
2 
~~==========~====~-------------------------------------------------------------
• 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPME:NT OF THE VETO POWER IN MASSACHUSETTS. 
The development or the veto power in Massachusetts may 
be studied within the framework of sLx important phases or 
Mas~achusetts history: (1) gov~rnment under the Colony 
Charter of 1629 (2) Massachusetts as part of the New England 
Co~~deration$ 1684 (3} government under the Provincial 
Charter of 1691, and (4) constitutional government, 1780-
1917. 
Government under the Colony Charter of 1629.-- Under 
the rirst government or Massachusetts,' executive and legisla-
tive powers were not clearly separated. The Charter of 
. . . 
Massachusetts-Bay granted by King Charles I, March 4, 1629, 
was in effect a grant of articles of incorporation to the 
Massachusetts-Bay ~ading Company empowering that company to 
trade, to make settlements, as well as to exercise political 
authority in the territory three miles north of the Merrimac 
and three miles south of the Charles. The government was to 
operate upon the principles of a. business corporation. Stock-
holders of the corporation, or freemen a.s they were called, 
were empowered to elect a Governor,.Deputy-governor, and 
eighteen Assistants to serve as officials of the company. 
--3-
' 
• 
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The Court of Assistants, composed of. the Governor, 
:J)_E:)puty-governor_~d Assistants constituted the director's 
meeting of the corporation. Although this body exercised 
the executive power of the government, many of its :functions 
were shared by the freemen. This occurred whenever freemen 
and Court of Assistants sat as the Legislature(General 
Oourt); 
And wee do, of our further grace, eertaine 
knowledge, and meere motion, give and grant to the 
said Governor and Company, and their successors, that 
ft shall arid may be law.full to and for the Govex-ner, 
or Deputy-governor, and·such·o.f the Assistants and 
Freemen of the said Coinpanie, for the tyme being as 
shall"be assembled~ any of their general courts 
a.foi"esaid·, ar in any other eourts to be specifically 
sUillitio:m.ed and as sembled .for that purpose, or·. the 
greater part of them (whereof, the Governor, or 
Deputy-governorarid.five o:f the Assistants, to be 
always seven) .from tyme to tyme to make, ordaine, and 
·establish all manner· of wholesome and reasonable orders, 
laws·~ •• ~ ·n.ot· eontraey· to the laws of thi.s our realm of 
Eilglan.d. • • • and f'or nameing and styling all sorts of 
officers both superior and inferior which they shall 
find needful for that government •••• and setting :forth 
the sev~ral dutief, powers and l~ts of ,every sueh 
office and place. • 
This passage from the Charter implies a mixture of powers-
' 
some legislative, and others, executive. Not only was the 
General Court empowered to make end establish laws, which is 
a legislative fUnction, but it was also empowered to appoint 
officials of government which is essentially an executive 
function. 
lnTh.e First Royal Charter Granted to the Colony of the 
Massachusetts-~ay In North America" in Robert Wilka1 Occasional Ess~s on Various Subjects, Robert Wilks, London, lo09, p. 66. 
• 
The only provision which approximates an executive 
check is the requirement that a quorum consisting of the 
Governor, Deputy-governor and at least seven Assistants 
be present before the Gene~a1 Gourt may transact its 
business. This provision,. however~ did not prove to be an 
effective cheek. Because measures were decided by a majority 
vote, the freemen who were more numerous than the Court of 
Assistants could easily outvote the latter. 
It was inevitable that the inconveniences and problems 
which resulted from the lack of a definite separation of 
po.wers should encourage the enactment of legislation designed 
to clarify the fUnctions of the executive and legislature. 
One of the basic problems which stimulated dissension and 
promoted clarification was that of voting in the General Court. 
Representation came about by assembling all the freemen 
-~the General Court in person. But starting in the year 
~634, the freemen of every town sent one or two persons to act 
as their personal representatives. • These representatives were 
called Deputies. Conflict finally arose when Deputies, out-
numbering the Assistants, wished laws to be passed by a 
m.aj ori ty of the whole. In 1644, as the result of a dispute 
between magistrates and Deputies over the case of Goody Sherman 
and her stray sow, the legislature passed a law which provided 
for the separation of the General Court into two eo-equal 
houses--the House of Assistants, and the House of 
Deputies.~ 
With the separation of the General Court into two 
co-equal houses, each branch was given the negative upon 
6 
the othero. By use of majority vote either House couJ.d 
prevent the passage of legislation. In the event either 
House voted negatively regarding a case of judicature, civil, 
or criminal, the case wouJ.d be presented to the body as a 
whole. A majority vote of the body as a whole would decide 
the case. Although the law of 1644 does not provide ~ 
Governor with a negative upon legislation, it does insure 
that the voting power of the Court of Assistants. (now House 
of Assistants) shall be as great as that of the House of 
Deputies, although the formero was a mueh smaller body. 
Massachusetts as part of the New England Confederoation, 
1684.-- The year 1684, marked the end of the Colony Charter. 
On May 21, 1686, Massachusetts was merged into the Dominion 
of New England which consisted of the colonies of Massachusetts-
Bay, New Plymouth, New Hampshire, and Maine e This marked the 
beginning of Royal: Government :tor Massachusetts. The most 
significant aspect of this governmental structure was the 
1 See Appendix A, p. 82. 
abolition of the Legislature as an institution of 
representation. Executive and legislative powers were 
now vested in the Governor and Council who were appointed 
by the King. 
The following paragraph from "The Commission of King 
James the Second to Sir Edmond Androstt provides for the 
concentration of executive and legislative powers in the 
hands of the Governor and Council: 
And wee do hereby give and grant unto you full 
power and authority by and with the advice and consent 
of our said Council or the major part of them to make 
constitute and ordaine laws, statutes and ordinances 
for the publiqUe peace, welfare, and good Government 
of our inhabitants thereof, and such other as shall 
respect successors which said laws and statutes 
ordinances are to.be as near as conveniently as may 
be agreeable to tbe1laws and statutes of this our Kingdom of England .. 
This Co~ssion granted many other powers to the 
Governor and Council-~money raising, taxation, erecting of 
courts of judicature, and appointing of judges. The 
governor and at least seven councillors constituted a 
necessary quorum. Although it was hardly necessary for the 
governor to possess the power of veto, he exercised the right 
to remove any councillor and to appoint another until such 
appointment could be confirmed by the King. This suggests 
11Iistorical Tracts, ncemmission of King James the Second 
to Sir Edmund Andros 11 Vol. IV, no. 8, p. 5. 
that any eouncil~or in disagreement with the policies or 
the governor could be removed without hesitation. 
Government under the Provincial Charter of 1691.--
It was not until five years later that the Governor o:r 
Massachusetts was specifically granted a negative voice 
over legislation. This grant .of veto power was expressed 
~ the Charter of 1691 which was granted to the Colony o:r 
Massachusetts-Bay by King William and Queen Mary-.1 This 
Oharter restored the General Court. T.he governor, 
lieutenant-governor, and secretary·were to be appointed 
8 
by the_King but thereafter were to be elected by the General 
Co~t subject to the approval of the Governor. The Counci~ 
served as an advisory body to the governor as wel~ as the 
upper house of the ~egislature. Consequently, its dual 
' functioDB were subject to dual;control.· Councillors· who 
opposed the Assembly could tail of re=eleetion; those who 
opposed the Governor could be rejected by him. The 
Governor's veto upon the approval of councillors proved 
most effective when it was used as a means of achieving 
co-operation on matters which c:O.uld be decided onl.y by 
Governor and Couneil, such as, appointment of officers, 
and the granting of probates of wills. On other matters in 
1 see Appendix A, p. 83. 
• 
which they sat as members of the upper house of the 
legislature, the eouncillors found themselves subject to 
discipline by the Assembly by virtue of the Assembly's 
power of election. Regardless of the Assembly's tactics 
to check executive power through its control over councillor~ 
the governor's us·e of the absolute veto would always 
determine the outcome. 
Between the years 1774·1780, another change in 
Ma~sachusetts government occurred. Among the "Five 
Intolerable Acts" of Parliament in 1774, was an act amending 
the Province Oharter so that the Governor's Council could be 
al;lpoj_nted by the King instead· o:r being elected by the General 
Court. The colonists objected vigorously to t~s legislation. 
The General Court was dissolved June 17, 1774, and on October 
1, 1774, the first Provincial Congress was held at Salem 
Massachu~etts. Durimg the nine months which followed, 
Massachusetts was governed by three ··Provincial Congresses. 
' The Province Charter was resumed but the previous governor, 
deputy-governor, and council were replaced by newly- elected 
officials.· The House o:r Representatives of the GeneraJL 
Court elected twenty-eight councillors who were given the 
executive power within the Colony and State o:r Massachusetts. 
This government during the Revolutionary Period did not prove 
very sueeessful. The Council o:r twenty-eight was often too 
• 
• 
slow gnd ineffective to control executive powers, 
especially during war time • 
. Constituti9na1 gover~en~ 1780-1917.-- The movement 
for a State Constitution began before the Province Charter 
was resumed. The General Court resolved itself as a 
Constitutional Convention, ~d on June 17, 1777, a joint 
commdttee of the General Court began the task of drafting 
J_Q 
a Constitution. On February 28, the completed Constitution 
was submitted to the pe0ple for adoption or rejection by a 
vote of two-thirds majority. 'This was the first State 
Constitution submitted to the people for popular approval. 
Because of its numerous defects, it was rejected by a vote 
of 2,083 yeas to 9,972 nays.1 This first Constitution 
lacked a Bill of Rights and the Governor had no negative 
. ---
over legislation; 
'The- Governor shall have no negative, as Governor, 
in any matter-pointed out by this Constitution to be 
done by· the Governor and Senate, but shall l;lave an 
equal voice with any Senator on any question before 
tliem; providedthat the-Governor, or, in his absence 
out of the State, the Lieutenant-governor, shall be 
present inthe Senate to enable th;em to proceed on the 
business assigned them by this Constitution as Governor 
and Senate. 2 
1Manual For The Constitutional Convention, 1917, Wright 
& Potter Printing Company, Boston, 1919, p. 16. 
2Massachusetts State Constitution, 1778 • 
11. 
Perhaps the most influential written statement . 
responsible for the rejection of the Constitution by the 
people was the Essex Result. This pamphlet was written by 
Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons, a twenty-seven year old 
lawyer of the town of Newburyport. It contained run advocacy 
for the possession of a strong veto power by the governor. 
The main tenet of this pamphlet was that the supreme power 
should be "formed and modelled, as to exert the greatest possi-
ble power, wisdom and goodnessu.l The Governor, with the 
consent of the Privy Council should be given a negative on any 
law enacted by the Je gisJa tive body • The fact that the 
governor depended upon the electorate for his office should be 
sufficient assurance tbat he would use discretion in his 
exercise of the veto. 
~e major tenets of the Essex Result formed the basic 
theory of the Constitution of 1780. John Ad~, to whom the 
task of writing the Constitution was given, incorp~ated into 
the Document, a paragraph which gave the Governor an absolute 
veto on legish tion: 
And the First Magistrate shall have a negative upon 
all the laws, that he may have power to 
1 Results of The Convention of Delegates: HOlden at 
Ipswich in the County of Essex., 1778, John Mycall, Newbury-
Port, 1778, p. 27. 
preserve the independfnce of the Executive and 
dUdici~l D~partments. 
12 
This paragraph was rejected by the General Committee of 
the Convention. At a subsequent time the subject crume up 
~gain, and it was moved and seconded that the report be 
amended to read: 
T.h~t the Governor of this commonwealth have a 
negative upon all laws, except those which shall be 
made and passed for the military defense of ~ State; 
and.that·he have a revision on thos~, to be conducted 
by the rules thereafter prescribed. 
This paragraph, too, was rejected by the Convention. 
After several hours of consideration and compromise, the 
finaJ. form of the paragraph was written into the 
Constitution. It now stands as Art. II, sec. I of the 
first ehap.ter of the present. Constitution.3 
This article provides that a bill becomes law·under any 
of the following conditions: (1) the governor signs the bill 
(?) the governor returns the bill unsigned and each House 
overrides the veto by a two-thirds majority, or (3) the 
lJournal of the Convention: Constitutional Convention 
1179-1780, p. 126. 
2 ~., p. 132. 
3see Append~ A, p. 84. 
governor refused to return a bill within five days after 
it is presented to him. 
13 
A bill fails to become law if it is returned unsigned 
by the governor and is not overridden by a two-thirds 
majority in each House. 
It was hoped that this article would give the governor 
a sufficient cheek over legislation, but by virtue of a 
legal loophole, the legislature actually assumed more power. 
The problem was basically this. What would become the legal 
status of a bill in the event the General Court adjourned 
before the expiration of the five day period and the governor 
had not returned the bill unsigned? Under the conditions, 
shoUld the bill become law or should it not? Because there 
was a lack of definition, the general practice was, that the 
bill woUld become law. This loophole provided the legislature 
the opportunity of passing bills near the end of the session 
thereby denying the governor his full time for consideration. 
In the year 1820, a Convention was called for the purpose 
of revising or altering the Constitution. This afforded an 
\ 
opportunity for the dropping or clarification of provisions 
which through the course of time had proven to be weak or 
faUlty. One of the issues clarified was that of the governor's 
veto. .The provision which was adopted became the first 
amendment to the Constitution.1 It provided that 1r the 
Isee Appendix A, p. 85. 
• 
General Court adjourned before the expiration of the five 
day·period alloted the governor, a bill whieh had not been 
signed by the governor nor returned to the legislature 
coUld not become law. 
The significance of this amendment is that it provides 
the governor with the executive weapon commonly called the 
~pocket-veto". If a law fails to pass because of the above 
conditions, the governor has automatically utilized this 
weapon. The peculiar aspect of "this power is that it is 
provoked by the legislature and not the executive. Should 
the legislature pass all laws in ample t~e for the 
governor to utilize his five day period, no use would be 
made of this veto. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1917 adopted two 
amendments which modified the use of the veto power. Art. 
LVI of the Amendments to the Constitution provided that the 
governor may return bills with suggestions for their 
-. -
amendment •1 
The specific advantage of this amendment is that the 
governor is given the opportunity to re-shape legislation so 
that it will be more in accordgnce with the general· policies 
of his administration • 
1 See Appendix_A, p. 85. 
15 
Art. LXIII, sec. 5 also adopted by the Convention 
~rovides that the governor may disapprove or reduce items 
or parts of items in appropriation bills.1 The specific 
advantage of this amendment is that the governor is given 
the opportunity to keep legislative appropriations in line 
with budgetary recommendations. 
Today, no legislation becomes law until it is 
presented to the Governor for his approval or disappr0val. 
If the governor signs a bill it becomes law at the end of 
ninety days. I.f the governor declares an act to be an 
eme~gency, it may go into effect immediately, a special 
act becomes law within thirty days, and a resolve becomes 
effective at once unless otherwise stipulated. If the 
governor fails to act upon the bill or resolve within five 
days (Sundays and Holidays not included) the bill becomes 
law except that when the General Court is prorogued before 
the expiration o.f the .five day period. 
The governor returns a vetoed bill to the House in which 
it originated with a written statement explaining his 
objections. The veto may be overridden by a two-thirds 
vote of each House. If a bill does not receive a two-thirds 
vote in the House in which it originated it does not go to the 
other branch for consideration. 
lMassachusetts State Constitution. 
16 
If a bill is returned with recommendations for an 
amendment or amendments, it is subject to reconsideration 
•·· . 
and re-enactment. If the bill is re-enacted it is again 
presented to the governor for his approval or disapproval. 
If ~e signs it, the bill becomes law. In the event he 
disapproves of it, his only alternative is to veto it for 
he cannot again make recommendations for amendment. 
In the event the governor disapproves or reduces items 
or parts of items in appropriati'on bills, the procedure is 
the same as with vetoes of ordinary bills. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
THE USE OF THE VETO POWER BY THE COLONIAL GOVERN~RS~ 
To the early inhabitants of' Massachusetts,, the governor '·s 
power of veto stood as a symbol of' f'orces which operated 
against popular control.. Tb.e f'reedom which had been exercised 
und'er the Colony Charter of 1629 had been (lenied by the 
Charter of' 1691.. That the veto was to be used to strengthen 
. the royal prerogative could not be denied,, for there were many 
instances in which royal governors were instructed by the:, 
Crown to reject measures harmful to British interests •. · 
·Upon vetoing measures pas sed by the General Court,. the 
colonial governors either stated that there had been no 
precedent f'or such action or that the acts were contrary to the 
interests of' the Crown.. This implied a determination on the 
part of' the governor to prevent the usurpation of' his powers 
by the legislature. 
The interaction between governor and legislature during 
the colonial period provides the basis f'or the interpretation 
of the veto power which later became a part of' the Constitu-
tional government of Massachusetts • 
William Phips~-- The first governor under the new 
18 
charter issued by Ki.ng William and Queen Mary in the year 
1691 was William Phips. Basic changes within the government 
were made by virtue of the charter, but most significant for 
the increase in powers of the governor was his power of veto 
upon officials elected by the General Court and upon 
legislation. 
Prior to 1691, the governor voted with the Assistants 
(Council) as a member of the upper house of the legislature 
and in the event of an equal vote he could break the tie. 
This was called a casting vote. Under the new provisions of 
1691, the governor had no vote in the legislature and 
theoretically was to have no general interest in matters of 
debate in the Council or the House. 
As first governor under the new charter, Phips did not 
utilize his powers of veto as often as the governors who 
followed him. However, in times of conflict or disagreement 
he did not hesitate to usa it. In May, 1693, Phips vetoed 
the election of Elisha Cooke as one of the councillors. Cooke 
was rejected mainly because he was the major spokesman of all 
those who opposed the new charter of 1691, and because he 
had opposed the appol:ntment of the governor while he was in 
England. As a result of this veto, Phips rapidly lost 
popularity among those who were opponents of the new charter. 
Before the close of 1693, he was finally recalled to England 
and left the colony in 1694. 
19 
Upon the recall of Phips, Lieutenant-governor, 
Willirum Stoughton, assumed the duties of the governorship 
until a new governor could be appointed by the King. The 
people looked upon the rule of a lieutenant-governor as merely 
a period of transition. Because his rule was expected to be'· 
short, there was practically no attempt to for.m parties 
against him, a.nd if there should be any misrule, the people 
realized that it would only be of short duration. Stoughton 
seldom relied wholly upon his own judgment, but relied mostly 
upon the judgment of the Council. This provided the lieutenant -
governor with a means of escape for the blame of unpopular 
measures. As a result, Stoughton held the reins of govern-
ment for four years--free from co~roversy with other branches 
of the ~~g;t]31ature.l· 
Richard, Earl of Bellemont.-- The new governor who 
arrived at Boston in 1699 was Richard, Earl of Bellemont. 
Because of his noble title, the people of the colony exerted 
themselves to show him respect and with·the greatest of politi-
cal foresight, he made every effort to incorporate himself 
with the people. At all times he appeared affable and courte-
ous. His administration was characterized generally by every 
!Albert Bushnell Bart, Commonwealth History of 
Massachusetts, Vol. II, The States History Company, New York, 
1927' p. 81. 
.. 
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effort to avoid unnecessary conflict with private persons 
or with either branch of the legislature. Perhaps his 
personality as governor enabled him somewhat to extend the 
royal prerogative in legislative matters. During his 
administration, he was concerned in all debates, proposed all 
business of the assembly, and recommended that the General 
Court resolve into committees upon bills or clauses in bills. 
He saw to it that the General Court did not act as house of 
parli~ent in his absence. When he was unable to meet the 
assembly he suggested that it postpone all business until he 
was able to attend.,l 
One noted instance in which Bellemont exercised the veto 
was in the case of the Harvard College controversy. T.he 
charter of Harvard College was abrogated with the abrogation 
of the Colony Charter of 1629. In 1692, the first General 
Court serving under the new charter of 1691 attempted·to 
provide Harvard with a new charter, only in doing so,~no 
provision was made for the visitation of the King by the gover-
nor. As a result of this omission, the act was disallowed in 
1695. A provincial statute of July 13, 1699 gave the power of 
visitation to the king and governor and, according to 
the charter, five Fellows of the corporation must always 
1 :rnid., p. 28. 
I; 
be elected from the Council. Bellemont refused to approve 
I 
of this act because of a stipulation which had been inserted 
I \ 
at the request of Cotton Mather and other ministers. The 
stipulation provided that the officers chosen must adhere to 
. ' ' \ 
the principles of the Reformation which were espoused by the 
' ' first colonists and which were ~n harmony 'fd th the pro:f'e.ssion 
I 
and practice of the Churches of Christ in. New England. 
Bell.omont objected to this act bee~use 'it tended to exclude 
m.~nib1ers of 111 th~ .Anglic.ari Chttrch.1 
I However, Bellomont' s overall· ability to• please the people 
I 
resulted in his obtaining a· large salary and gratuity--larger 
than any governor preceding or following b1m.2 This is 
probably the major instance in which the General Court 
utilized the power of the purse as an acknowledgement of a 
reigp which was f'avorable to the colony. · 
Joseph Dudley.-- ~oseph Dudley (1702-1714) was the next 
I 
goveP.nor to be appointed by the King. It was his intention 
after taking over the seat of government to strictly preserve 
the royal prerogative. MOst of' alL he desired that the goveFr 
• I n»rl»~ given a f'ixed salary for it had be~ome quite evident by 
then that the redu.ctioa or increase of the g()vernor•s salary 
could be utilized as a means to force approval upon certain 
~bid. J; p. 24. 
2 Ibid., p. 28. 
' 
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measures. He could perceive readily the encroachments of 
the legislatll.re upon the powers of the executive and in an 
effort to check this growing usurpation of powers he 
utilized the veto power by refusing the names of five 
councillors. Dudley accused the legislature of electing 
councillors whom he thought less qualified than ones who had 
been chosen last year. He fUrther noticed that persons whom 
he thought most qualified were omitted from the list. Upo:a 
these grounds be proceeded to veto five names: Elisha Cooke, 
Peter Sargent, Thomas Oakes, John Saffin, and John ~adtord. 
Elisha Cooke was nominated again the,next May and again in 
1706 but both t~es the governor vetoed the selection. The 
governor's refusal to approve Thomas Oakes as Speiker of the 
' House, one of the most influential leaders of the colony and 
supporters of the old charter, resulted in a serious dispute 
as to the legality of Dudley t s action. The House voted that 
it was not the power of the governor to refuse the election 
of a Speaker. Dudley maintained however that if he had the 
right to negative acts of assembly it was implied that he had 
the right to refuse to ratify the election of the presiding 
officer.l 
In the case of the refusal of the councillors, 
1 Ibid., p. 22. 
--
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Dudley's right w~s not denied. Although his actions had 
been disapproved, it was largely because of the long disuse 
of the negative and its sudden resumption rather than its 
legality which alarmed the General Court. Dudley was in such 
disfavor of the assembly that the House granted ~ five 
hundred pounds for the year which was five hundred pounds 
less than that granted to Bellomont. Dudley made the appeal. 
that the governor be given a suitable sa.lar7 and that the 
sum should be fixed permanently. The assembly rejected 
Dl_ldleyrs appeal holding tha_t to fix a permanent salary would 
be against the Constitution of the province.. The House held 
th~t it was the privilege and right of English subjects to 
~~i~e and dispose of money according to the present state of 
affairs.l 
Thus the power of the purse was again a.sserted and as a 
result of its effectiveness; Dudley gave up the idea of 
vetoing the choice of Speaker as well as vetoing councillors 
nominated by the House. 
upon the removal of Governor Dudley in 1715, Colonel 
Burgess was appointed governor by the Crown, but through the 
influence of Jonathan Belcher and Jeremiah Dummer he was 
coerced to resign.2 
lr,oc. cit. 
2 5 ~., P• 2 .. 
• 
• 
Samuel Shute.-- Colonel Shute was then appointed 
governor. His administration was marked by disputes over 
the salary question and the·rejection o~ the Speaker o~ the 
House. In 1719, Shute vetoed the House's choice of Cooke 
as Speaker. In 1725, the Crown issued an Explanatory 
Charter stating that the governor had the power to veto 
the choice of Speaker as well as the sole power to adjourn 
1 the House. Thus the power o~ veto was extended by the Crown 
and in de~inite terms. Once Shute attempted neither to 
approve nor disapprove of a list o~ officers. This occurred 
when the General Court presented before him a list containing 
the names of the treasurer, impost o~~icers and other civil 
o~ficers for approval. The House sent a message asking if 
the governor had passed upon the list. The governor 
answered curtly that he would take his own time. As a means 
of coercion the House then decided that it would not consider 
any grants or allowances until the governor had passed upon 
the acts, resolves and elections of that session. As a 
further means of retaliation the House withheld the salary 
of the governor and other of~icers who depended upon the House 
for their grants of salary .. 2 
~xplanatory Charter of 1725, Massachusetts Archives • 
2Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and 
Province of Massachusetts-Ba~, Vol. II, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1936, p. I 2. 
• 
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Shute exercised his veto once again upon a bill 
attempting to impose duties on Wes.t Indian goods and wines 
and upon English manuf'actu!'ers. The f'irst year that this 
bill was brought up, it was assented to by Shute. England 
cautioned the governor that such a bill would endanger the 
trade of' England. The f'ollowing year Shute warned that he 
woi.lld veto a bill similar to the one passed the previous year 
unless the duty on English vessels was lef't out. The House 
attempted to make the bill acceptable by changing the word 
11English" to 11 Europeanu. The bill proved unsatisfactory to 
Shute and he vetoed it.1 The General Court attempted 
retaliation in many ways--by refusing to pass legislation 
desired by the governor$ by electing a Speaker without his 
approva1, 2 and by reducing the governor's salary.3 
William Burnett and Jonathan Belcher.-- The .administrations 
of William Burnett, 1727, and Jonathan Belcher, 1729, were 
characterized by further vetoes of officials of the General 
Court and additional conflicts concerning the expenditure of 
iHart, op. cit., p. 132. 
2Massachusetts Journal of' the House, Vol. III, p. 4. 
3Hart, op. cit., p. 130. 
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money. In 1727, William Burnett utilized his veto upon the 
election of two Councillors, Belcher and Little. Burnett 
vetoed the election of Isaac Little on the grounds that he 
was "immoral and of unfair character. ul Burnett also 
objected to a bill which provided for supplying the treasury 
with twenty pounds. He vetoed the bill on the grounds that 
he would agree to no supply of the treasury but such as was 
in practice before 1721. 2 
Jonathan Belcher was appointed governor in 1729. It was 
his intention to uphold the royal prerogative but soon he 
joined the opposition for the purpose ·of increasing his impor-
tance among his fellow citizens. This, however, did not 
prevent the development of differences between House and gover-
nor. The House had begun to audit expenditures and had begun 
to designate the purposes for which money raised was to be 
used. The governor vetoed any such bills on the grounds that 
the Charter provided that money was to be expended by the 
governor 11by and with the advice and consent of the Council. n3 
As a result of this action, the province treasury remained 
empty until the end of his administration in 1741. 
1Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 276. 
2 Ibid., p. 271. 
3Hart, it 138 op.c .,p •• 
• 
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William Shirley.-- Governor Shirley (1741-1757) followed 
the policy of avoiding controversies with the legislature at 
the expense of the prerogative. When disagreements did arise 
his personality tended to minimize the issues.· His one notable 
attempt at the exercise of the veto was in the case of the 
admission of new towns. The colony of Massachusetts-Bay was 
rapidly developing and the Crown became alar.med by the admis-
sion of new towns with the addition to the assembly of those 
factions which might prove detrimental to the governor and 
Council. Shirley therefore vetoed the admission of seven towns. 
Later, the governor admitted seven new towns but without the 
right of representation.1 
Sir Francis Bernard.-- During the administration of Gover-
nor Barnard, 1760-1769, the House designed a bill authorizing the 
provincial treasurer to bring action against a custom's officer 
for fines due to the province on smuggled molasses. Bernard 
opposed the bill on the grounds that the Attorney-general should 
bring the action.2 In the session of 1766, several of the 
governor's favorites had failed of re-election. In retaliation 
for this overthrow, the governor negativfod the candidates 
chosen in place of the crown officers and judges on the grounds 
that they would betta constant and uniform opposition to the 
1 Ibid., p. 143 • 
2 Ibid., p. 147. 
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administration o:f government upon all occasionstt.l Bernard 
admitted that he had negatived two of the councillors because 
they had a hand in preventing the election of the crown 
of'ficers and judges .• 2 
At the eve of the Revolution, the chief problems o:f the 
day became those pertaining to the rights of Parliament in 
its relationship to the colony. There:fore, during the 
administration of' Thomas Hutchinson, tl::e Ja. st of the civil 
royal governors, the chief questions were no longer governor 
versus assembly~ The period was essentially characterized by 
the lgalistic arguments as to the rights of the colonies under 
the rule of England. It was during this :re riod that the 
governor received his salary :from England and not from the 
colonial legislature. 
A study of the use of the veto pCH" er by the colonial 
governor revealed a struggle between the forces of popular 
government and the forces of royal control. The veto power 
had been the weapon utilized to maintain royal supremacy 
whereas the power or the purse had been utilized by the legis-
lature to maintain popular control. Be:fore long,-the 
balance between the two forces gave way to the side of popular 
governmente The battle which preceded such victory gave no 
indication of laxity on the part of the royal governors f'or 
1 Ellen E. Brennan, Plural Off:in e Holding in Massachusetts 
1760-1780, Uhiversity of North Carolina Press, Durham, 1945, 
p. 82. 
2Loc. cit. 
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everything within their power was done to maintain the 
- . 
roya1 prerogative. The ge~ of self government and 
responsibility which had been written in~o t~ charter of 
1629 had proved of lasting influence in Massachusetts govern-
ment. However1 it was not until the year or the first Mass~­
chusetts State Constitution in 1780 that sueh influence was to 
become a working principle. The ~truggle over the veto power 
of the governor during the Constitutianal Convention revealed 
the c~ution involved in strengthening tb& governor's veto 
·power. The remnants· of royal. control cou+d not be easily 
forgotten. 1 Its· strong points were separated from its weak 
points and what remained became incorporated into a new 
interpretation of self' government. 
The remainder of this study ha~ been devoted to ascertain-
ing the new interpretation of the governor's, veto power. 
-
--
, r 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VETO POWER 1780~1859 
This chapter presents a statistical analysis of the 
vete power of the governor o£ Massachusetts between. 
1780-1859~ Data for this chapter has been collected from 
the Massachusetts Senate and House Journals and from tl:le 
Massachusetts Acts and Resolves. The veto messages found 
within these volumes were the sources for the numerical 
count and classification of vetoes found within this chapter. 
The analysis of the veto covers a span of eighty years 
st~~ing with the year of the first Massachusetts State 
Constitution in 1780 until the year preceding the Civil 
War. For purposes of analysis, the eighty year period has 
been divided into ten groups of years with each group 
consisting of eight years.. This arrangement provides a 
statistical approach which is conducive to study over both 
large and small periods of years. Within the statistical 
breakdown of years it is possible also to observe trends in 
the veto power in relation to state and national historical 
events. 
The s~gnificanee of the veto power has been analyzed in 
several aspects: (1) the relationship between the veto power 
and the volume of legislation (2) the significance of party 
politics and the use of the veto, and (3) the interpretation of 
-30-
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the use of the veto as revealed within the veto messages of 
the governor. 
The relationship between the veto p'ower and the volume 
of legislation.-- In the Massachusetts state legislature, or 
General Court as it is called, all propositions for legislation 
are called "legislative doeliments". The two types of legisla-
tive documents which require executive approval are acts and 
resolves. An act is legislation which applies to the Common-
wealth as a whole and is general in nature. Acts are 
established permanently unless modified or repealed. 
Resolves are constructed for special or temporary legislation 
' 
and their validity ends as soon as their objectives have be~ 
obtained. 
Table 1 sho~s the relationship between the number of bills 
passed and the number of bil1s vetoed and sustained between 
1780-1859. Bills . tvetoed• refer to those acts and resolves 
which the governor returned to the legislature unsigned with 
his objections; vetoes •sustained' refer to the unsigned acts 
or resolves which upon reconsideration for enactment by the 
legislature failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote 
of' both houses. 
According to Table 1, the total number of' bills passed 
between 1780-1859 was·26,451. Of these bills, 56 or 0.2 per 
cent were vetoed. Of the 56 bills vetoed, 44 or 80 per cent 
e. 
Table 1. Bills Passed, Vetoed, and Sustained between 
1780-1859 
Years 
1780-1787 
1788-1795 
1796-1803 
1804~1811 
1812;,.1819 
1820-1827 
1828-18,35 
1836-1843 
1844~18-51 
18.52-1859 
T'ota1 
Bills 
Passed 
4078 
2815 
2130 
2273 
2735 
1721 
2055 
1996 
3146 
3502 
2645la 
Bills Vetoes 
Vetoed Sustained 
12 9 
6 5 2 
10 7 
2 2 
4 
5 ~ 
"2 2 
13 10 
56 44 
aFor a complete list of bills passed, vetoed, 
and sustained see AppendiX B, p. 86. 
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were sustained. An anaJ.ysis c£ the eight year periods between 
1780-1859 revealed no correlation between the number of bills 
vetoed gnd the number of bills passed. ~e rise or fall in the 
number of bills passed did not indicate a corresponding rise 
or fall in the number of bills vetoed. Observation o~ the four 
groups of years having the ~ghest number of bills passed 
tended to reveal this. Prior to 1788, 4078 bills were passed 
and 12 bills were vetoed, but between 1.852-1859 when only 
3502 bills were passed, 13 bil1s were vetoed. Between 1844-
1851, 3146 bills were passed and only· two bills were vetoed, 
whereas between 1788-1795, 281.5 bills were passed and s~·bills 
were vetoed. 
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The greatest volume of legislation and bills vetoed 
occurred prior to 1820. During this period, 14,031 bills 
were passed and 29 bills were vetoed. This meant that 53 per 
cent of the bills passed between 1780-1859 were passed.prior 
to 1820, and that 53 per cent of bills vetoed between 1780-
1859 were vetoed before 1820. 
Between 1820-1859, the volume of legislation decreased 
to 12,420 and the total number of. vetoes decreased to 27. 
Although the number of vetoes decreased after 1820, the 
decrease in vetoes was relative to the decrease in the number 
of bills passed. Between 1780 and 1819, bills were vetoed on 
an average of one bill every five years. Between 1820-1859 
bills were also vetoed on an average of one bill every five 
years. Thus the percentage of bills passed to bills vetoed 
prior to 1820 was the same as that after 1820. 
The trend is somewhat different in the case of vetoes 
sustained. Similar to the relationship existing between the 
number of bills passed and the number of bills vetoed, there 
is no correlation among the number of vetoes sustained, the 
number of bills passed and the number of bills vetoed within 
the eight year periods between 1780-1859. An increase or 
decrease in one does not indicate an increase or decrease in 
the other. But unlike the number of bills vetoed and the 
number of ~ills passed, the largest number of vetoes sustained 
occurred after 1820 and not before. 
Between 1780-1820, twenty-nine bills were vetoed and · 
21 or 72 per cent were sustained, whereas af'ter 1820,. 
26 bills were vetoed and 23 or 88 per cent were sustained. 
A similar relatio)ilship existed between the percentage o:r 
ve~oes sustained and the percentage of bills passed. 
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Between 1780-1820 the percentage aftbills passed to vetoes 
sustained was e.l5 per cent whereas after 1820, the percentage 
was 0.19 per cent. 
.,; 
Table I revealed that no bills were vetoed between 1812~ 
1819. This may be possibly at~ibuted to the basic problems 
. ..._ i.. 
with which Massachusetts was confronted at the time. The 
ef'fect of' the Embargo Act was immediately seen in the decline 
of New England shipping and commerce. Such eond!tions 
gradually culminated in the Hartf'ord Convention of' 1814. 
The Massachusetts legislature was largely concerned at that 
time with providing for the defense of' the state as well as 
. -
~or the common def'ense of' New England. Such conditions pushed 
other domestic problems to the background. The Federalist 
Party united'in an effort of' defense. 
Thus f'ar the veto power has been analyzed in relationship 
to the volume of legislation passed. The purpose of' such 
analysis has been to ascertain the relationahip between the 
number of' bills passed and the number of' bills vetoed and 
sustained. Although the analysis provides a somewhat 
mechanical basis for seeking relat.ionships it does reveal 
• 
• 
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certain tendencies which cannot be overlooked. However, 
a study of the veto power cannot be separated from the 
politics of which it is a part. The political party system 
which provides the machinery by which the government is put 
into operation is certain to have a bearing upon the operation 
of the separation of powers. A basic assumption has been 
that when the party of the majority of the legislature is 
different from the party of the .governor, there is a tendency 
for the governor and legislature to conflict to an extent 
which is injurious to an effective functioning of government. 
If such be the case, then what if any bearing has this upon 
the operation of the veto power? It will be the purpose of 
the following section to analyze such relationship. 
The significance of party politics and the use of the 
veto.-- A study of early Massachusetts political parties 
revealed that prior to 1794, the formation of political 
parties was obscure and unsystematic. Although there is 
evidence of the existence of several political factions, 
there is no way of ascertaining the political composition of 
the legislature during this period. 
Between the years 1780-1794 three factions appeared upon 
the political scene in Massachusetts--the Hancock faction, 
Bowdoin faction, and the Warren-Gerry faction. 1 The general 
lAnson Ely Morse, The Federalist Party in Massachusetts 
to the Year 1800, Hazlett, Harrison & Company, Trenton, 
1909, p. 19. 
I I -- __ 
tendency toward these alignments has been traced to the 
~~edia~e Post-revolutionary period, but lines became more 
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· apparent during the period of the adoption of the State 
Constitution ~ 1780. The Hancock faction, or Hancoeko~an 
Party, represented what remained of the colonial aristocracy 
and early Whig Party •1 Its leader, John Hancock, had early 
plunged himself into state politics and had accumulated a 
following largely swayed by his great patriotic zeal. The 
Bowdoin faction, led by James Bowdoin, represented a more 
conservative element in polities and later became the 
Federalist Party. 2 The Warren-Gerry faction represented 
the stern republicanism of that day an~ later became the 
backbone of the anti-Federalist Party.3 
However, it was not until the year 1794 that a Massachu-
setts governor was identified with the anti-Federalist Party. 
upon the death of John Hancock in 1793, Samuel Adams, 
lieutenant-governor, succeeded to the governorship, and in 
the year 1794, Adams who had held strong anti-Federalist 
sentiments, was elected as governor.. The majority of the 
legislature during Adams' administration was Federalist and 
had been so as early as 1.789. This brief period of anti-
1 -
Loc. cit. 
2A. E. Morse, op. eit., p. 24• 
3Loc. cit. 
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Federalist domination ended however with the election of 
Increase Sumner in 1797 when the Federalist Party captured 
both the executive and legislative branches of government. 
This domination continued under the a&ministration of Caleb 
Strong who became governor in 1800. 
In the year 1807, James Sullivan, first Republican 
. . 
governor~ (Democratic-Republican), took the oath of' office. 
During his administration the majority of the legislature was 
Republican but with the election of the second Republican 
governor, Christopher Gore, in 1809, the Federalists gained· 
. . 
control of the General Court. In the year 1810, Elbridge 
Gerry was elected governor by the Republican Party but the 
legislature remained Federalist until the following year. 
Shortly afterwards,_ a bold attempt was made by the 
Republicans to reshape district lines so that their 
representation in the General Court might be increased. 
Similar attempts to reshape district lines had ever since 
been called •gerry-mandering•.1 Between 1812•1822, the 
Federalists dominated both the executive and the ~gislative 
branches with the exception of' 1812 when the Republic ana 
captured both houses of the legislature. 
Starting with the year 1822, several transformations on 
1 Albert Bushnell Hart, Co:annonwealth History 2."! Massachusetts, 
Vol. III, The States History Company, New York, 1927, P• 1i$8. 
the political party scene in Massachusetts became evident. 
One of the first changes which became apparent was the 
decline of the Federalist Party. The election of the 
Republican governor, William Eu.stis in 1822 marked the end 
1 
o.f Federalist Party domination in Massachusetts. This did 
not mean however that the Republicans were to exalt any 
- . 
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supremacy in state affairs. In fact; three years later, the 
- . 
Republican Party was destined to disappear from the political 
scene until revitalized and reshaped in the fo~ of the 
Democratic Party in 1840. ~ election of 1825 marked the 
b~ginning of executive leadership under the newly formed 
National Republican Party. 2 Levi Lincoln, the National 
Republican governor, represented the core of the conservative 
interests, protectionist manu£aeturers, internal improvements 
men, and bankers. Levi Line oln held the reins of government 
until 183.3 and was supported by a National. Republican majority 
in the Je gislature wb.:ic h had gained control. of the legislature 
in 1827. In 1834, John Davis was el.ected on the National 
Republican tieket1 '1bu~ in>the last yea:t> of his administration 
(1835) the newly :t'ormai'Whig Party maintained a majority in tm 
i.Alhert Bushnell Hart~ Commonweal-th Histo:ey of 
Massachusetts, Vol. IV, The States History Company, New York, 
l930, P• 77. 
2 Loc. cit. 
legislature and held a majority until the ~ear 1851. 
The ~gs, however, dominated the executive branch only 
. . 
until 1840. 
Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, a new state party was in 
the making. A group o~ sea-coast Federalists who disliked 
the idea of protectionism, and the more radical elements of 
the Republicans formed a Democratic Party in Massachusetts 
which in 1829 became fused with the Jacksonian Democratic 
movement.1 
The first governor to be el~cted on the Democratic 
ticket was Marcus Morton in 1840. The Democrats, however, 
' \ did not ~ntain a stronghold in Massachusetts and 
- -
, ' . ' I 
relililq1lished their power in 1841 to the "Whigs under the 
leadership of John Davis. Between 1844-1853~ the ~gs 
captured both the executive and legislative branches of 
government relinquishing it only once in 1851 to the 
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Democrats under the governorship of George Boutwell. However, 
in the yes:r 1848, there had appeared on. the state scene the 
beginnings of a new political party devoted to the creed of 
extreme Americanism directed against the foreign elements of 
the population. The so-called, Know-Nothing Party rapidly 
gained a following m d between 1854-1858 eaptured both the 
executive and legislative branches of' the government. 
Such brie:fly has been the historical development o:f 
political parties in Massachusetts between 1780-1858. 
. . 
Within the sixty-five year period, seven different political 
parties had assumed the reins of government, and 1n :fi:fty-
I 
three years the majority o:f the ~gislature was of the same 
party as that of the governor. What bearing did these 
fa~t~rs ha~e upon the_ operation of the veto powe~? 
A statistical analysis of the period revealed the existence 
of a de:finite l"elationship between the political party o:f 
the executive and legislature and the use of: the veto. 
Table 2 indicates the trend in the use o:f the veto power 
between 1794-1858 when the majority o:f the legislature was of 
the same political party as that of the governor. When such 
a_ relationship between the governor and the legislature 
exists the term 'similarity' has been used to denote it. 
Table 2 shows the period o:f years, the number o:f years 
within the pe:riod in which similarity existed, tls total 
number of vetoes throughout the pe~iod and the number of bills 
vetoed during the years o:f similarity, the total number of 
bills passed over within the period., and the number o:f bills 
passed over during the years of similarity. 
The number of bills •passed overt refers to those bills 
vetoed by the governor which upon having been returned to the 
legislature were overridden by a two-thirds majority o:f both 
houses of the legislature and subsequently became law. 
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Table 2. Bills Vetoed and Passed·Over Dur~g 
Years o:r Similarity 
Years of Total Vetoes Total Vetoes 
Years Similarity Bills During Vetoes Passed Ovtm-
Vetoed Simi~ity Iassed _puring 
Over ; ~s~mi1ari ty 
1794-1803 ~ 5 1 3 ]. 1804-1811 1.0 9 .3 2 
1812-1819 7 
1820~1827 7 2 2 
1828..;1.835 7 ~ 4 1836.;.1843 6 ]. 
-1844-1851 8 2 2 
1852-1858 6 11 8 3 2 
Total. 53 a 39 27 9 5 
aFor a complete list of bill.s vetoed and passed 
over during years of similarity see Appendix G,p. 91. 
According to the statistical data presented in Table 2, 
in 53 out of 65 years, or 82 per cent of the total years 
studied, the majority of the legislature was of the same 
party as that of the governor. Within' the 65 year period, 
39 bill.s were vetoed. Of the 39 bills vetoed 27 or 69 per 
cent of them were vetoed during the years of similarity. 
Of the total number of bills vetoed, nine or 23 per cent were 
passed over. But five or 55 per cent of vetoes passed over 
during the 65 year period occurred during the years of 
similarity. 
Table 3. Bills Vetoed and Passed OVer During 
Years of Dissimilarity 
Ye~s of Total.· Vetoes Total Vetoes 
Years Dis simi- Bills During Vetoes Passed 
lar1ty Vetoed Dis simi.- Passed OVer Dur-
larity Over ing 
Dis simi-
larity 
1794.;.1803 :3 5 4- 3 2 
1804:..1811 3 10 1 3 1 
1812-1819 1 
1820:..1827 1 2 
1828:..1835 1 ·~ -18~:..1843 2 4 
18 •1851 2 
-1852-1858 1 11 3 3 1 
Total 12 a 39 12 9 4 
aFor·a complete list of bills vetoed and passed over 
during years of dissimilarity see Appendix 0, p. 91. 
Table 3 indicates the trend in the use of the veto 
power when the majority of the legislature was not of the 
same political party as that of the governor. When such a 
relationship between the governor and the legislature 
existed, the term 'dissimilarity• has been used to denote 
it. With the exception of 'dissimilarity', Table 3 gives 
the same information as Table 2. 
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Table 3 reveals that within a period of 65 years, there 
were only 12 years of dissimilarity. This represents 18 per 
eent of the total years studied. Of the 39 bills vetoed 
throughout the 65 year period, 12 or 31 per eent occurred 
during years of dissimilarity. Of the nine bills passed 
over, only four or 45 per cent occurred during years of 
dissimilarity. 
Although the data revealed that more bills were 
vetoed and passed over during years of similarity than in 
years of dissimilarity further analysis of the data 
indicated that the rate of veto was greater during years of 
dissimilarity than in years when there was similarity. 
Within years of similar~ty, bills were vetoed at the rate 
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of one bill every two years, whereas during the years of 
dissimilarity, bills were vetoed on an average of one a year. 
It also became evident that the rate at which bills were 
passed over was greater during years of dissimilarity than 
in years of similarity. J)uring years of s~lari ty the 
percentage of bills passed over to bills vetoed was 18.5 
whereas during years of dissimilarity, the percentage of 
bills passed over to bills vetoed was 33. Thus the percentage 
of bills passed over during years of dissimilarity was 14.5 
per cent greater than in years of similarity. 
The governor's veto and reasons for its use.-- An 
analysis of the data thus far would tend to warrant the 
assumption that party dissimilarity heightens the conflict 
between governor and legislature. However, the dogmatism of 
such an assumption must be allayed upon the acknowledgement 
• 
that vetoes and vetoes passed over do occur within years 
of party similarity. It is not unlikely that such 
occurrences would happen in the event of voting across 
party lines or in the event of dissension within the 
political party. Also it is not unlikely that a thought-
less governor would oppose legislation which is truly 
worthwhile. In fact, the role of the governor as party 
leader, combined with his responsibility as protector of 
the rights of the people, has become more and more clearly 
defined in Massachusetts government. The fact that some 
bills are returned by the governor and that others are not 
must surely depend upon the governor's determination. 
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The extent to which his determination rests upon historical 
circumstances, political situations, or personal whims must 
form an important part of any i~quiry as to the significance 
of the veto power. 
Table 4 reveals the number of bills vetoed and the 
grounds upon which the governor based his veto. The 
determination of such grounds was made possible by an 
analysis of the veto messages of the governor. Such 
objections were classified as •unconstitutional', 
'policy', 'defective• and, 'unnecessary' • 
Table 4. 
Year 
]. 780~1787 
1788-1795 
1796-1803 
1804~1811 
1812-1819 
1820-1827 
1828-1835 
18~~1843 
I8· · -1851 
1852-1859 
Total 
Nambe~ of Bills Vetoed and Reasons 
fo~ Veta 
Bills Unconsti- Policy Defective 
Vetoed tutional. 
1·2 9 2 
6 4 1 1 
1 
-
1 
10 6 2 2 
2 1 2 
~ 2 .2 4 1 
2 1 1 
13 10 2 
55 36 10 8 
Unneces-
ss.rrr 
1 
2 
-. 
l. 
2 
6 
Table 4 indicates that tne total numbe~ of vetoes between 
1780-1859 were 55. Of these$ 36 o~ 65 per cent ~ere vetoed on 
grounds of unconstitutionality; 10 or 18 pe~ cent were vetoed 
on po1icy g~ounds; eight er 15 per eent were vetoed because of 
defectiveness, and six or 11 per cent were vetoed because they 
were considered unnecessary. In some instances, more than one 
reason was given for a veto; this accounts for the greater 
number of ~easons than vetoes. 
Vetoes based on grounds of unconstitutionality~-- It 
became apparent that_b11ls vetoed on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality were of two specific types--bills conflicting with 
the National. Constitution and bills conflicting With the 
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State Constitution. Of the 36 bills vetoed on grounds of 
~c?ns~itutionality, only two were vetoed for violations 
against the National Constitution. These oceurred in 179~ 
and 185,5. Prior to 1789, there was no National Constitution 
... 
with which the states could come into conf'lict, and inl794, · 
when the first veto message was delivered in defense o:f ·the 
National Constitution, there was uncertainty on the part o:r 
l 
the governor as to the possibilities of conf'lict~ 
t\1 On June 26, 1794, Governor Samuel Adams vetoed a resolve 
con~erning the :fortifying· af Castle Island and ei1lploying 
· convicts there as laborers. Previo':lBlY the Congress of the_ ... 
United States had passed an act which empowered the President 
of the United States to employ troops as garrisons in the 
•. . 
fortifications. Wherever the President could place a 
..... 
garrison, the civil jurisdiction of the particular state was 
excluded. The resolve of the General Court stated that_ upon 
the fortification o:r Castle Island, no property or jurisdiction 
. . . 
of the Commonwealth would be alienated. Governor Adams vetoed 
the resolve on the grounds that such a claim would conf'liet 
wi~h the national government.1 
During the height o:f the anti-slavery crisis in 1855, 
the General CoU.rt passed all~~ act "To Protect the Rights and_. 
Liberties of The People of the Csmmonwealth of Massachusetts". 
].Massachusetts Journal of' the House, May 1794-Feb. 1795, 
Vol. XV;" p. 155 .. 
• 
The act was directly designed to thwart the enforcament 
of the Fugitive Slave Law recently pa·ssed by CoDg:roesa. The 
Massachusetts act provided for penalizing 'an1 state officer 
. --
who took part in the capture or return o:f any :fugitive. 
Governor Gardner based his objections upon a Supreme Oourt 
ruling which upheld the sovereignty o:f each state over the 
jurisdiction o:f its inhabitants.l 
All other objections on grounds o:f unconstitutionality 
were based upon violations against the State Constitution. 
Between 1780 and 1827, the objections based on grounds 
o:f unconstitutionality with the State Constitution were 
~uestio?s as to the proper jurisdiction o:f the bills under 
consideration. Otten legislation overstepped the bounds 
ascribed to the General Court and in some inst~ces bills 
'!"ere drafted which p erta.ined to matters rightfully within 
the scope ot the executive or judiciary departments. 
In 1785, James Bowdoin vetoed a resolve which would 
establish a eo:mmi ttee for the purpose of settling public 
accounts. The commdttee was to be responsible tor administer-
ing the support o:f certain indigent persons. The governor 
objected to this bill on the grounds that it was the duty o:f the 
governor with the advice and consent o:f the Council to assume 
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, 
the responsibility for such persons. The legislature could 
. 1 
provide only for granting the funds for such support. 
In 1791, John Hancock vetoed a bill in Which the 
legislature was to give an explanation as to the meaning of 
a part of a wfl,l lef't by the late Hon. Testator James 
Bowdoin Esq. The governor vetoed the bill on the grounds 
that such action was within the proper scope of an attorney 
and was not within the scope of the General Oourt.2 
The predominance before 1820 of vetoes involving juris-
dictional unconstitutionality may be explained by the attempt 
o~ the part of the newly formed Massachusetts government to 
maintain its newly developed system of sep~ation of powers. 
Article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution provided 
the basis for many objections based upon jurisdictional. 
unconstitutionality: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the 
legislative·department shall never exercise the 
executive and judicial.powers, or either 0f them: 
the ··executive shall never· .exercise the legislative and. judicis+ powers, or either o:f them: the judicial shall 
never exercise the legislative and executive powers or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of 
1 aws and not o:f men • .:S 
.. ! 
1Massachusetts Journal of the House, May 1785-May 1786, 
Vol. VI, P• 189. . 
· ·
2Massachusetts Journal of the House, May 1790-March 
1791, Vol. XI, P• 3~ 
3Ma:ssachusetts State Constitution. 
e. 
S~arting with 1820, objections based on groUnds of 
conflict with the State Constitution we~e more V§ried. 
Few objections were of a jurisdictional nature and mo~e 
objections pertained to provisions of the State Constitution 
which heretofore had not been in question. 
In 1835, Governor Gardner vetoed an act "To Aid the 
Vermont and Massachusetts Railroad Company. u The act pro ... 
vided for a state loan of one million-dollars to the cor-
poration. Governor Gardner objected to the measure by saying: 
"The authority to loan the state credit is nowhere expressly 
~anted in the Constitution, and under the most liberal. 
~onstitution can only properly be exercised when demanded by 
1 
a great public exigency." 
In 1857, Governor Gardner vetoed a resolve concerning 
the relief of settlers in the Territory of Kansas. The 
resolve provided for an appropriation of $100,000 for the 
relief of bona fide settlers in the Territory of Kansas. 
The purpose of such an appropriation was to meet the danger 
which had come from the increasing dissensions between tm 
northern and southern settlers over the slavery question. 
The governor vetoed the bill on the grounds that the 
Massachusetts State Constitution provided only for the defense 
, ,• I 
of the subjects of Massachusetts •. Because the former residents 
l.Massac;Q,usetts ,H"ournal of the House, Jan.-May, 1855, Vol. 
XXX; p. ·f44L 
of Massachusetts were now bona fide citizens of Kansas, 
there was doubt that they could be considered subjects of 
the Comm.onwe al th. 1 
The greatest bulk of bi11s vetoed as unconstitutional 
(10) occurred between 1852-1859. Nine of these bi11s were 
in confJ.ict with provisions of the State Constitution 
ex~luding jurisdictional unconstitutionality, and one bill 
. l . 
was vetoed because it conflicted with the National 
eonstitution.' The decrease in the nmn.ber of bills vetoed 
I 
on jurisdictional grounds seemed to indicate that the 
: ,; ·\ ..... ,,, ' . 
problems of stat-e government wer·e. Q_ecomi~ more concerned 
with s afegua.rding the rights of the individual under the 
Constitution and less with defending the branches of the 
government from en_croachments upon eaep. other. 
Vetoes eoncerliing questions of poJ.ic:y.:~- The second 
category into which the 1argest number of vetoes we~e found 
was that of policy. Vetoes based on questions of policy 
were usually directed against those bills which the governor 
felt to be harmful. to the state or to the nation as a whol.e. 
Usually they were directed against the establishment of 
•dang~rous precedents• in legislation end were most often 
used to safeguard the status quo. Veto messages of this 
nature were most often directed against bill.s invol.ving social. 
1Ma.ssachusetts Acts & Resol ve.s.., May, 1857, p. 759. 
• 
welfare, poor relief, slavery, private property, public 
expenses, and local government (especially the city of 
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·Boston). In some instances bills were vetoed for no apparent 
reason than for being 'contrary to the interests of the 
people.' The latter justification tended primarily to be 
the mere expression of the individual judgment of the governor 
with little else to justify his convictions. 
Prior to 1820, the majority of bills vetoed on policy 
grounds was objected to for being contrary to the interests of 
the people. 
In 1796, Governor Samuel Adams vetoed a resolve 
providing for filling up vacancies in the Electors of Presi-
dent and Vice-president of the United States. The bill 
provided that the Electors themselves could fill any vacancies 
which would occur by death or resignation. The governor 
vetoed the bill on the grounds that such action appeared t9 be 
dangerous to the liberties of' the people and should not be 
allowed to form·a precedent in. a free government.1 
After 1820, the majority of bills vetoed pertained to 
pr!vate property, the r~ght of contract, slavery, public 
eXpenses, and local government. 
In the year, 1827, Governor Lincoln vetoed a bill 
Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, November, 1796, p. 64l. 
--
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establishing the Warren BriQ.ge Corporation. The bill gave 
- -
~J:t~- _ ~or:Porati~~ _1;~e power· _to c~eate a tc:>ll free bridge 
across the Charles River to Charlestown. Previously the 
Charles River Bridge Corporation had constructed a bridge 
across the river in the same direction; the contr.act o:f' this 
corporation had not yet expired. The governor vetoed the bill 
on ~he grounds that the 1e gisla.ture would impair the :f'orce 
o:f' contract by allowing the construction of a toll free 
bridge near a toll bridge. The toll :f'ree bridge would always 
be preferred to the toll bridge and the latter would be 
·destroyed.1 
In 1837, the governor vetoed a resolve increasing the 
compensation of' the members of the two houses o:f' the Genera1 
Court and of' the Executive Council. The bill was vetoed on 
the grounds that the treasury eouJd not stand the drain on 
its funds at the present time. He said: 
I cannot persuade myself af'ter careful considera-
tion o:f' the subject in this light, that it is eXpedient 
to divert to 1the object proposed ~y the resolve so large a portion of' the funds requtred to reimburse the 
temporary loans made to de:f'ray the ordinary demands on 
the treasury for the year 1836 • 
. I f'eel my-self therefore compelled by a strong 
sense of'- pU,blic duty to wi thbold my assent :f'rom the 
resolve •• ~.But a strong conviction of' the entire 
inexpediency at a. time o:f' extensive embarras sm.ent 
ama distress and in the abo~e described condition of' 
the treasury of' adding so largely to the public 
lMass. Acts & Resolves, March, 1827, p. 510. 
I -
53 
expenditure ••• ahas compelled me reluctant!y to 
wit~old my approv~ fr~m this resolve... . 
Af'ter 1820 there was a slight increase in the number of 
bills vetoed on policy grounds. Because of the increasing 
scope of state government piercing into all areas affecting 
the relationship of the individual to the state, it was not 
unlikely that such an increase would occur. 
Vetoes because of .defective bills.-- Objection on 
grounds of defectiveness formed a third category into which 
a number of vetoes fell. Between 1780-1819, eight bills 
were vetoed because of their defectiveness. Usually a bill 
was considered defective i£ three major deficiencies 
occurred: (1) the bill failed to cover the scope of 
legislation s~ficiently (2) necessary provisions within 
the bill were omitted, and (3) faulty construction prevented 
clarity .. 
T.he first veto in Massachusetts history was based upon 
grounds of defectivenessa2 In 1781, Governor Hancock vetoed 
a resolve concerning requi.sitions for supplies for the 
Eastern Department. Although the resolve provided fdl-a 
requisition for a supply or· articles for the Eastern Department 
1 Massachusetts Aets & Resolves, (April, 1837), p. 576. 
-2 . 
See Appendix D, p. 96. 
.. 
no such articles were in the public stores of the Common-
wealth. A proper consideration of the problem would 
necessitate that the legislature provide some means for 
obtaining the desired munitions. 
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In 178.5, Governor Bowdoin vetoed a bill providing for 
the removal of all prisoners to Castle Island for the 
remainder of their sentences. The governor stated that since 
the remainder of some terms would be shorter than others, and 
because of the necessary expenses incurred, some provision 
should be made whereby the number of months before removal 
would be specifiedal 
In 1830, Governor Lincoln vetoed an act making further 
provision respecting costs in certain cases. He vetoed the 
complete bill because of the ambiguousness of one section of 
it. He said: " The whole of that section (sec. 4) seems to 
me to be ambiguous and of doubtful construc~ion and certain 
'of its provisions somewhat inconsistent with and repugnant to 
each other.u2 
Vetoes of bills considered to be unnecessary.-- The 
category into which the smallest number of vetoes fell was 
that of being unnecessary. 
1 Massachusetts Act & Resolves, November, 178.5, p. 7.55 • 
2Massachusetts Acts & RNsolves,Mar~h, l830, p. 304. 
• 
Bills vetoed on grounds or being unnecessary were 
usually those involving the expenditure or money. 
In 1782, Governor Hancock vetoed a resolve appointing 
thre.e gentlemen for the purpose or advising the A13sistant 
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Treasurer in conducting the business.appropriate to his 
orfice. The governor vetoed the bill on the grounds that the 
appointment of an Assistant Treasurer was sufficient for the 
handling of the business and that three assistants would 
only incur unnecessary expenses.l 
In 1857, Governor Gardner vetoed a bill concerning 
idiotic children. The bill proposed to increase the annual 
grant to the Idiotic School from $5, 000 to $7,500. T.he 
governor vetoed the bill because he considered the average 
cost per pupil ($170) too expensive. In defense of his 
convictions he said: 
lt (the resolve) proposes to increase the annual 
grant.to the Idiotic School of $5,000 per annum to 
l!P7, 500I'for the present year.,... Since 1851, the State 
has granted between $55,000 and $60,000 to this 
institution, and in the present condition of her 
treasury, I deem the proposed increase inexpedient •••• 2 
1 Massachusetts Journal of the House, May,l782- March, 
1783, Vo1. III, p. 168. 
2 
Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, May, 1857, p. 759 • 
• 
CHAPTER V 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VETO POWER 1860-1952 
In the decades which followed the Civil War~ Massa-
chusetts underwent several important changes. The govern-
mental system of Massachusetts had been modified by con-
stitutional amendments, Massachusetts had risen significantly 
in the educational field, had llllderta.ken many social and 
religious reforms and had initiated many reorganization move-
ments on the state and local level. · The problems of labor 
reform, woman suffrage, and prohibition became hot-beds of 
political controversy. How these issues and problems were to 
be handled became the center.of political thought and specula-
tion. With the expanding function of state government, the 
area of state regulation and control increased. The creation 
of government commissions, problems of public hygiene~ and 
public charitable agencies, gave impetus to the need for de-
fining more closely the relationship between the individual 
and the state. Demands upon the chief executive were being 
made from all sides. His role as representative of the people 
was being re-defined as his-role of party leader became more 
pronounced. The veto power as an executive check upon legisla-
tion was to undergo changes which became inevitable as the 
scope of government broadened. 
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Table 5·. Number of Bills Passed, Vetoed, and Sustained 
1860-1952 
Years 
1860-1868 
1869-1877 
1878-1886 
1887-1895 
1896-1904 
1905-1913 
1914-1922 
1923-1931 
1932-1940 
1941-1952 
Total. 
Bills 
Passed 
3377 
3863 
3492 
5214 
5654 
1005 
6609 
4278 
3973 
7972 
Bills 
Vetoed 
20 
13 
22 
37 
60 
107 
70 
113 
157 
118 
717 
Vetoes 
Sustained 
16 
13 
18 
31 
59 
78 
68 
97 
132 
113 
625 
aFor complete list of bill.s passed, vetoed, and 
sustained see Appendix B, p. 86. 
The effect of the increase in legislation upon the 
veto.-- Since 1859, the volume of legislation in the General 
Court had increased approximately two-fold. Between 1860-
1952, a period of 93 years,_ a. total of 51,437 bills were 
passed. An increase in the number of bills vetoed during this 
period is also apparent. Between 1780-1859, fifty s~ bills 
were vetoed; between 1860-1952, 717 bills were vetoed. 
Table 5 presents the amount of legislation passed, bills 
vetoed and vetoes sustained between 1860-1952. According 
to Table 5, the total number of bills passed between 1860-
1952 was 51,437. Of these bills, 717 or 1.4 per cent were 
• 
--"![. ' .. '".;, . .,...,, 
. ....:~. 
vetoed. An analysis of the nine-year periods between 
1860-1952 revealed no correlation between the number of 
bills vetoed and the number of bills passed. The rise or 
fall in the number of bills passed did not indicate a 
corr~sponding rise or fall in the number of bills vetoed. 
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Between 194l-1952, 7972 bills were passed and 118 bills were 
vetoed, but between 1932-1940, when only 3973 bills were 
passed, 157 bills were vetoed. This represented the highest 
number of bills vetoed among the nine-year periods. Again, 
between 1905-1913, 7005 bills were passed and 107 bills were 
vetoed, but between 1923-1931, when only 4278 bills were 
passed, 113 bills were vetoed. 
During the first half of the 93 year period (1860-1904) 
fewer bills were passed and vetoed than during the second half. 
Of the 21,600 bills passed between 1860-1904, one hundred 
fifty-two bills were vetoed. This meant that 42 per cent of 
the total bills passed between 1860-1952 were passed before 
1905, and that 21 per cent of the total bills vetoed between 
1860-1952 were vetoed before 1905. Between 1905-1952, the 
volume of legislation increased to 29,837, and the total number 
of vetoes increased to 565. This indicated that between 1860-
1904, bills were vetoed on an average of 1 three bills a year, 
whereas between 1905-1952, bills were vetoed on an average 
of 12 bills a year. Although there were fewer bills passed, 
vetoed, and sustained before 1905, than after 1905, the 
percentage of vetoes sustained to bills vetoed during 
that period was greater. Between 1860-1904, 137 out of 
152 vetoes were sustained. This represented 90 per cent 
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of vetoes sustained. After 1904, 488 out of 565 vetoes were 
sustained. This represented 86 per cent of vetoes sustained. 
The use of the "pocket veto".-- Included in the numerical 
count of vetoes in Table 5, is the pocket veto. By virtue 
of the Constitutional Convention of 1820, an runendment to 
the Constitution was made providing that·bills not ·presented 
to the governor within the legal time for his consideration 
and which did not receive his signature would not become 
law. Such amendment became necessary when it became 
apparent that a number of measures were being ·rushed through 
for enactment during the last few days of the session. If 
such hurried legislation was to become legally permissible: 
the veto pow~r of the governor could be easily by-passed. 
Several attempts were made by governors to thwart the 
actions of the legislature. As early as 1784, Governor 
Hancock attempted to discourage such action by threatening 
to keep the General Court in session until he had enough 
time to consider the bills before him. The House was in-
formed that it would not be prorogued unless two resolves 
which were presented to him a few days previously would 
be recalled and referred to the next annual session. As 
a result of his stand, the House recalled the bills for 
consideration at the next annual session and the General 
1 Court was prorogued. 
Such measures,.however, did not prove very effective, 
for in most instances the governor's threat was only a 
bluff. When definite attempts were made to discourage 
such action, the legislature only refused to acknowledge 
that such attempts were made. In the year 1809, a bill 
which passed both houses of the legislature toward the 
end of the session was sent to the governor. The bill 
was not returned with his objections until the next 
annual session. The House of Representatives refused to 
accept the veto on the grounds that the five day period 
for consideration had expred at the close of the session. 2 
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There has been no way of ascertaining the exact number 
of pocket vetoes between 1820-1860, but recent trends tend 
to indicate that the volume of bills passed during the end 
of the session J::ra s decreased considerably within the past 
century. Between 1860-1952, only seven bills were pocketed. 
These occurred during the years 1862, 1883, 1895, 1923, and 
1927. Two pocket vetoes occurred in 1895 and two occurred 
in 1923. 
~assachusetts Journal of The House, May 1793-March 
1794, p. sao. 
2Journal of Debates and 
B~egates, Da y Adver ser, 
Convention of 
• 
The small use o£ the pocket veto tends to indicate 
the attempt on the part or the legislature to avoid the 
inevitable de£eat or its measures. 
6J. 
The veto and reduction or items in appropriation bills.--
In order to provide £or the elimination or abuses in the 
method of appropriating money through direct and individual 
legislation, and in order to prevent a large number or 
appropriation bills from consuming the time o£ the legis-
1 lature, the Budget Act o£ 1918 was passed. As, however, 
this act did not give the governor the right to veto items 
in appropriation bills. or prevent a repeal of the law by a 
future legislature, it became necessary to reinforce such 
reforms by constitutional amendment. 2 Inl919 such 
intentions resulted in a permanent budget system for the 
Commonwealth or Massachusetts. The governor's power over 
state affairs was broadened by giving him tbe power to veto 
or reduce items or parts or items in appropriation bills. 
Since that time, six appropriation bills ha"VS::ibeen revised by 
the governor. 
Table 6 reveals the number of items vetoed and reduced 
in appropriation bills for the six years mentioned. OUt 
lLuther H. Gulick, Evolution o£ the Budget in Massa-
chusetts, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1920. 
2see Chapter II, p. 15. 
-• 
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Table 6. Number of Items Vetoed and Reduced 
in Appropriation Bills for Six Years 
Year Items Vetoed in Items 
Appropriation Bills Reduced 
1925 3 5 
1932 5tt 1939 2 
1941 2 
1949 2 
1950 1 
Total 64 9 
of a total of 73 items revised by the governor, sixty-four 
or 88 per cent were vetoed and nine or 12 per cent were 
reduced. In each of the bills, the governor's vetoes or 
reductions were sustained and the remainder of the bills 
became law. In 1941, a bill was returned by the governor 
with the recommendation that an item of it be first amended 
and then reduced. The speaker, however, ruled that such 
item was not properly before the House and could not there-
fore be sustained. However, the other revisions of the 
governor were sustained.1 
In general, the governors gave as their reasons for 
vetoing or reducing items that the financial conditions of 
~ssachusetts Acts & Resolves, 1941, p. 1236. 
• 
63 
the Commonwealth would not permit any· additional eXpendi-
tures. In 1932, Gover.nor.Saltonstall was forced to veto 
itemB which he had included in his original recommendations 
for legislation. He held that his action would tend to 
lighten the burden which would fall on the cities and towns 
through a state deficit.1 
A typical ex~ple of the veto and reduction of itema in 
appropriation bills is given in Table 7. The table shows 
Table 7. Amount Appropriated, Items Reduced and Vetoed in 
an Appropriation Bill:" of 1925 
Item Subject Appropri- Reduced Vetoed 
ation 
269 Gypsy and Brown Tail $75,000 $60,000 
moth suppre.~ion 
271 .Purchase and develop-
ment of state forests 200,000 50";;.000 
274b Miles Standish Monu-
ment Station 3,000 vetoed 
362a Building at Bridgewater 
Normal School 652,000 586,000 
365a Purchase of land, 
Fitchburg Normal Sch. 7,000 
-
vetoed 
tllt~a Danvers State Hospital 591,940 586,940 Rebuilding a barn 
destroyed by fire at 
606 
reformatory for women 8,100 vetoed 
Improvements, develop-
ments & protection of 
rivers and harbors 100,000 50,000 
Total lb37,040 1,332,000 
lMa.ssachusetts Journal of the House, June 1939, p. 1522. 
the rumount appropriated, ite~ reducad and items vetoed-in 
an appropriation bill of 1925. Although separate reasons 
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were given for each item, the general desire of the governor 
in vetoing the items shown in Table 7 was to keep the state 
taxes as low as possible. 1 
That only six appropriation bills have been revised 
by governors of Massachusetts since 1919 may be explained 
by the fact that in effect the governor's budget becomes the 
basis for the general appropriation bill. Items are vetoed 
or reduced when in the opinion of the governor the legi~lature 
changes his recommendations or adds items which are not in 
accord with his'fiscal program. 
The significance of party politics and the use of the 
veto.-- Since the Civil War period, Massachusetts has been 
predominantly a Republican state. At the close of the war, 
many of the people of Massachusetts felt it their patriotic 
duty to give their support to the administration which had 
assumed the glory of winning the war, and to this end they 
united in the common approval of one party. 2 The significance 
of this factor upon the use of the veto power must call into . 
1Massachusetts Journal of the House,. March, 1925, p. 655. 
2Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonwealth History of 
Massachusetts, Vol. IV, States History Company, New York, 
1930, p. 588. 
-question once again the trend in the veto power when the 
majority of the legislature is of the srume political party 
as that of the governor. 
A study of the party composition of the governor and 
legislature between 1860-1952 revealed the relatively weak 
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position of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts politics. 
Out of a period of 94 years, the Democrats held the governor-
ship for 22 years without once holding a majority in the 
legislature. 1 
Years 
1859-1868 
1869-1877 
1878-1886 
l887-189~ 
l896-l90 
l905-19l3 
1914-1922 
1923-1931 
1932-1940 
1941-1952 
Total. 
Table 8. Bills Vetoed and Passed Over During 
Year of' Similarity 
•t•ota:I vetoes Total Vetoes 
Years of Bills During Vetoes Passed 
Similarity Vetoed Similarity Passed During 
Over 
Over Similarity 
10 23 23 4 4 8 13 13 
8 22 9 t 3 6 37 26 6 
9 60 60 1 1 5 107 36 29 
7 70 50 2 2 
8 113 102 16 l5 
2 157 23 25 
6 118 88 5 5 
69 720 430 92 36 
Table 8 indicates the trend in the veto power during 
the years in which the major~ty of the legislature was of 
1 See Appendix C, P• 95. 
• 
-
the srume party as that of the governor {similarity). 
According to the statistical data presented in Table 
8, in 69 out of 94 years or 73 per cent of the total years 
studied, the majority of the legislature was of the srume 
party as that of the governor. Within the 94 year period, 
120 bills were vetoed. Of the 720 bills vetoed, 430 or 60 
per cent of them were vetoed during the years of party 
similarity. Of the total number of bills vetoed, 92 or 
13 per eent were passed over, but only 36 or 39 per cent 
of vetoes passed over during the 94 year period occurred 
during the years of party similarity. 
Table 9. Bills Vetoed and Passed Over During 
Years of Dissimilarity 
Vetoes 
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Years 
Years of Total 
Dissim- Bills 
ilarity Vetoed 
Vetoes 
During 
Dissim-
ilarity 
Total 
Vetoes 
Passed 
Over 
Passed Over 
During 
Dissimilarity 
1859-1868 ... 23 
1869-1877 1 13 
1878-1886 1 22 
1887-1895 3 37 
1896-1904 6G 
1905-1913 4 107 
1914-1922 2 70 
1923-1931 1 113 
1932-1940 r 157 1941-1952 118 
Total 23 720 
13 
11 
71 
20 
11 
1~~ 
286 
4 
t 
1 
29 
2 
16 
25 
5 
92 
1 
29 
1 
25 
56 
• 
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Table 9 indicates the trend in the use or the veto 
power when the majority or the legixlature was not or the 
same political party as that or the governor (dissimilarity). 
According to Table 9, there were only 23 years or party 
dissimilarity. This represented 35 per cent or the total 
years studied. or the 720 bills vetoed, 286 or 40 per cent 
or them were vetoed during the years or party dissimilarity. 
or the 92 bills passed over, 56 or 6l'per cent occurred 
during the years or party dissimilarity. It is evident that 
during years or party similarity, bills were vetoed on an 
average or six bills per year, whereas during years or party 
dissimilarity bills were vetoed on an average or 12 bills 
per year. 
~ther analysis or the data revealed that the largest 
number or bills vetoed occurred during the depression and 
pre-w~r years (1932-1940)--the total number or vetoes 
having been 157. During seven or these years, the Democrats 
controlled the executive branch or the government while the 
Republicans controlled the legislative branch or government. 
During this period, 134 bills were vetoed. This represented 
85 per cent or the total bills vetoed between 1932-1940. 
Another signiricant reature concerning the use or the veto 
during the depression years is the trend in the number or 
bills pas.sed over. During the depression and pre-war years 
(1932-1940) 25 bills were passed_over. All 25 or these bills 
• 
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were passed over dtiring the years o£ party dissimilarity. 
The next largest number of vetoes occurred between the 
years 1905-1913. Although there were only £our out o£ nine 
years of party dissimilarity, characterized by Democratic 
control o£ the executive branch, the Republican control o~ 
the legislative branch, a total of 71 bills were vetoed. 
The total number of bills passed over for these years was 
29. 
The years 1923-1931 marked the period in which the 
highest number of bills vetoed occurred during party 
similarity. 'The Republicans were in control of both the 
executive and legislative branches of government £or a 
period of eight years. During this period 113 bills were 
vetoed. Of this number, 102 or 90 per cent occurred during 
years of party similarity. This represented the highest 
percentage of bills vetoed among the nine-year periods 
presented within this chapter. During this period, 16 vetoes 
were passed over and 15 of them occurred during the years of 
party similarity. 
The governor's veto and reasons for its use.-- A study 
of the governor's reasons for veto revealed the impact 
of social and political events upon the interpretation of 
the veto power. Classifications o£ the grounds .or veto were 
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made upon the basis of the content of the veto messages 
f mmd in the Senate and House Journals and in the Mas sa-
chusetts Act & Resolves. Such objections were categorized 
as 'policy', 'unnecessary', 'defective' and unconstitution-
al 1 • 
Years 
1~60-1868 
1869-1877 
1878-1886 
1887-1895 
1896-1904 
1905-1913 
1914-1922 
1923-1931 
1932-1940 
1941-1952 
Total 
Table 10. Number of Bills Vetoed and 
Reasons for Veto 
. 
BillS Policy Un- Defective 
Vetoed neces-
sary 
20 6 9 
13 7 3 1 
22 15 3 2 
37 28 2 4 60 ~~ 14 2 107 13 3 
70 46 14 6 
113 91 12 5 
157 132 18 4 
118 96 18 3 
717 547 97 42 
Unconsti-
tutional 
5 
2 
2 
3 
~ 
~ 
3 
1 
31 
Table 10 indicates the distribu~ion of vetoes upon the 
grounds previously categorized. T.he data presented in 
.. 
Table 10 indicated that between 1860-1952, a total of 717 
bills were vetoed. Oi' these, 547 or 76 per cent were vetoed 
on policy grounds and 31 or 4 per cent of the bills were 
vetoed on grounds of unconstitutionality, 97 or 14 per cent 
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were vetoed because they were considered to be. unnecessary 
arid 42 or six per cent were vetoed because of defectiveness. 
Vetoes based on grounds of policy.--An analysis of the 
data revealed that the ~rgest category into which a number 
of vetoes fell was that of policy. Similar in general 
content as the policy vetoes mentioned in Chapt~r IV, vetoes 
on grounds of policy between 1860-1952 pertained largely to 
the general welfare of the state and the nation as a whole. 
In general, vetoes on grounds of policy were directed 
against the establishment of harmful precedents in legisla-
tion and were most often utilized to maintain traditional 
practices. Between 1860-1904, the majority of vetoes based 
on policy grounds pertained to questions of increasing the 
salary of public officials, protection of the fish and 
game laws, protection and safeguarding the moral life of the 
citizens, and insuring the non-interference of the state in 
the affairs of looal government. The type of veto on policy 
grounds which predominated prior to 1904 was that based upon 
the advisability of raising the salary of certain public 
officials. In the year, 2895, Governor Greenbalge vetoed 
two acts; one, establi~hing the salary of the clerk of the 
courts of the county of Plymouth and one, establishing the 
salary of the clerk of the police courts of Brockton. In 
., -~ ~-··"'.'" 
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justifying his action he said: "I do not consider the 
present an opportune t~e to increase the salaries of public 
officials. ttl 
Governor Crane, a staunch believer in local self govern-
ment, vetoed a bill which would have permitted the Massachu-
setts state legislature to bypass the local authorities 
of the city of Boston. The act, concerning the system of 
playgrounds for the city-of Boston, had been petitioned by 
a group of private citizens and did not have the official 
endorsement of the mayor of the city. The bill would have 
authorized the issuance of a loan by the state for the 
purpose of taking lands for playgrounds. T.he governor vetoed 
the bill on the grounds that the city had adequate 
authority to prescribe methods by which land was to be taken 
for playgrounds.2 
After 1905, the majority of· vetoes on policy grounds 
was directed against bills concerning the expenditure of 
money and bills concerning unemployment compensation, 
pensions, and civil service. In 1912, Governor Foss vetoed 
a resolve "To Provide for Certain Additions and Improvements 
at the Worcester State Hospital and Calling for $111,700. u 
He based his objections on the grounds that the institution 
had already exceeded the normal limit of its monetary fund 
and that instead of money being spent to extend the insti-
lmassachusetts Acts and Resolves, May 23, 1895. p. 748. 
2 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, April, 1900, p. 55~. 
• 
tution, a new institution should be established.l The 
bulk of compensation bills vetoed occurred during the years 
of the depression and early pre-war years. Governor Hurley 
returned, 11 An Act Relative to the Payment in Certain Cases 
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of Annuities to Dependent Brothers and Sisters of Certain 
Public Employees killed or Dying from Injuries received or 
Ha~ards Undergone in the Performance o:r Dutyn. He vetoed the 
bill on the grounds that under thee xisting law, brothers and 
sisters could not be classi:fied as dependents. Only widows, 
minor children and parents were eligible to receive annuities.2 
Vetoes o:r bills considered to be unnecessary.-- A second 
category into which a number o:r vetoes :fell was that o:f being 
unnecessary. Prior to 1904 many bills vetoed on grounds of 
being unnecessary were those in which the governor contended 
that there was no particular demand :for the type o:r legisla-
tion. In 1871, Govern~r Cla:flin vetoed an act authorizing 
two gentlemen to construct a whar:f in Nahant. The governor 
based his objections upon the grounds that the lessors had no 
knowledge o:r their intention to construct a whar:r and that 
they had protested against it. Also,the public opinion o:r the 
town was against the construction o:r the whar:r. Speci:fically, 
1 Massachusetts Journal o:r the House, May 1912, p. 1764. 
2 
Massachusetts Journal o:r the House, May, 1937, p. 1271. 
he said: 
There seems to be no public demand for any such 
structure, and the proposed landing is not for the 
benefit of the people or Nahant and is not asked for 
by them •••• A grant or this kind should be for the 
public good, or, at least ~ot to the aetriment or the 
neighbors of the grantees. 
After 1905, the bulk of bills vetoed on grounds or 
being unnecessary pertained to the expenditure of money, and 
bills which merely voiced repetition of existing laws. 
During the later period, bills vetoed on grounds of being 
unnecessary were not very distinguishable from those vetoed 
on policy grounds. A bill objected to by Governor Dever in 
1952 provided a good example or this. The bill in question 
was to authorize cities and towns to examine welfare records 
and administration. Dever vetoed the bill on the grounds that 
such records should not be open to public officials but that 
they should remain in private hands. He accused the legisla-
tion of being a •snoop bill' which would only provide for 
opening up confidential records to the public. He declared 
this bill to be unnecessary and undesirable.2 
Vetoes because of defective bills.~- The general 
criticism of bills classified as defective throughout the 
1 . 
Massachusetts Acts & Resolves,March,l870-1871, p. 832. 
2 
Massachusetts Journal of the House,JulY,l952, p. 1774. 
93 year period was that o~ poor construction. In 1894, 
Governor Greenbalge, vetoed "An Act to Permit During February 
and March the Sale for Food o~ Trout Arti~icially reared in 
This Commonweal thn. He vetoed the bill on the grounds that 
the wording o~ the bill was vague and ambiguous. He contended 
that the words 'arti~icially rearedt were neither precise nor 
de~inite. They were ambiguous terms and could be construed 
to mean trout reared in hatcheries or trout ~ed on ~ood that 
was artificially supplied.l 
Vetoes based on grounds o~ unconstitutionali~.-- The 
smallest category into which a number of vetoes fell was that 
of unconstitutional. Similar to the basic categories presented 
in Chapter IV, the bills vetoed on grounds of uncons ti tuti.on-
ality were objected to because of violations against the 
State Constitution or violations against the National 
Constitution. The majority of such bills was based upon 
violations against the State Constitution. In 1910, Governor 
Draper vetoed a resolve providing one Mr. Russell with a 
payment of $1000 out of the treasury because o~ an injury 
which he received from an automobile which was operated by a 
representative o~ the State Highway Commission. The governor 
contended that evidence had proved that the car was under 
1Massachusetts Acts & Resolves,April, 1894, p. 868. 
2 Massachusetts Acts & Resolves, June, 1910, p. 723. 
~:;;; ."--· .. .,._, 
• 
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the control of a person who was learning to drive under 
the supervision of a representative from the Highway 
Commission and that such an appropriation to Mr. Russell 
would be a gratuity and therefore would be unconstitutional~ 
Special legislation in the General Court.-- A majoritu 
of bills passed in the Massachusetts state legislature has 
pertained primarily to special or local interests. In the 
early history of the Massachusetts state legislature, 
re~esentatives to the General Court were considered as 
agents of their respective constituencies rather than as 
representatives with delegated powers. This meant that the 
merit of an early le;gislator rested primarily upon the 
number of bills he was able to pass which directly benefited 
his particular constituency. Such an interpretation of 
legislative duties resulted in the introduction of numerous 
bills pertaining primarily to individual or small group 
interests.2 
Between 1910-1917 an average of 308 special acts, 
306 general laws, 151 resolves, and 121 appropriation bills 
were passed each year. Many of the resolves and some of the 
appropriations were special in nature. 3 
lMassachusetts Acts & Resolves, June, 1910, p. 723 • 
2Robert Luce, Legislative Problems, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston, 1935, p. 540. 
3~., p. 544. 
The practice o:f passing numerous local and special 
laws has been well summarized by Dr. Han:ford, late 
pro:fessor o:f Harvard University. He said: 
About hal:f o~ the actual output o:f the 
legislature, and even a larger proportion o:f the 
bills introduced, consist of special and local 
measures authorizing cities and towns to borrow 
beyond their debt limits; granting pensions to 
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special local employees; changing the name o:f city 
o:fficers; creating pUblic utility, charitable, and 
educational corporations; regulating the location of 
garages in a particular city; authorizing a speci:f.ie d 
charitable society to acquire property; authorizing a · 
particular city to sell or lease certain land held by 
it for playground purposes; authorizing the registration 
o:f Mary Jones as a chiropodist without examination, etc. 
Then too there are numerous measures regulating the 
details o:f administration which should :fall wi thj:n the jurisdiction o:f some department or cammission ••• 
The problem o:f special legislation became the subject of 
several veto messages. In vetoing a measure considered to be 
special legislation in 1926, Governor Fuller said: 
I do not think the citizens of Massachusetts are 
going to continue to sit idly by and without protest 
watch this ever encroaching special legislation place 
burdens upon them, compelling many citizens to con-
tribute towards the levy required for special 
legislation, who, :from a :financial standpoint, are 
much less able to contribute than those who receive it •••• 
Every public servant must ask himsel:f as to what right he 
poB"sesses to pass legislation which will take :from all 
the people their money and give it to a :favored :few or 
to a special group.2 
1nbert Bushnell Hart, Commonwealth Hist<r y o:f 
Massachusetts, Vol. V, p. 4J-. 
2 Luce, op. cit. p. 543-44. 
Although the amount o:f local and special legislation 
is still quite prominent, the trend has been to enact 
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laws which will lessen the volume o:f such legislation in the 
General Court. One o:f such laws enacted directs the Senate 
and House counsel and department heads to recommend the 
. 1 
passage o:f general laws in place of special laws. 
1 Hart, op. cit. p. 42. 
• 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
T.he p~edominant concern of this study has been to deter-
mine the significance of the veto power in Massachusetts. An 
analysis of such power from the colonial period to the present 
has revealed a progressive trend ·of inte~pretation which 
suggests the dynamic nature of this power as well as its endur-
ance. 
In its first interpretation, the veto power in Massachu-
setts was regarded as an imposed powere Having been imported 
from England as a means of preserving the royal prerogative, 
the veto power wielded by the royal governors was looked upon 
with suspicion ana doubt. 
In the early constitutional period of Massachusetts, the 
governor wielded the veto power 'in the interests of safeguard-
ing the newly developed system of checks and balances. T.his 
accounts largely for the fact that during the egrly period most 
bills vetoed as unconstitutional were objected to because the 
scope of legislation covered by them rightfully belonged within 
the jurisdiction of tle other branches of gov·ernment. 
As soon as the workability of the separation of powers had 
become well established in Massachusetts, the governor's role 
-78-
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changed from that of 'guardian of the separation of powers' 
to that of 'protector of the common interests of the peoplet • 
T.his later concept explained the predomdnance of vetoes, after 
~820, concerning questions of policy. Thus it was not 
uncommon to find a large percentage of bills vetoed which per-
tained to private property, public expenses, and local govern-
ment. The increase in the number of such vetoes indicated 
also that the sphere of state government had broadened and had 
embraced more intimately the lives of its citizens. 
In evaluating the veto power of the governor of Massachu-
setts one may with all fairness conclude that constitutionally, 
the veto provisions leave very little to be desired. Not only 
must all bills be presented to the governor for his approval, 
but sufficient time is given the governor in order that he may 
consider the merits of each bill. Since the ~endment 
providing for the pocket veto, no measures can bypass the 
governor by legal loopholes. The Constitution further providE 
that the governor be given the power to amend bills and to 
veto and reduce items or parts of ite~ in appropriation bills. 
Such powers potentially give the governor much responsibility 
in shaping measures to meet his approval. In the case of the 
item veto, the governor has been given further control 
over financial matters. The concern for sound and economical 
• 
government has become his prime responsibility. 
What,then, has been the actual operation of the veto 
power in Massachusetts? 
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An analysis of the statistical data presented within 
this study has revealed certain tendencies in the use of the 
veto power in Massachusetts between 1780-1952: 
1. The percentage of bills vetoed to bills passed in 
Massachusetts has been small. The total number of 
bills passed in Massachusetts between 1780-1952 was 
77,888 and the total number of vetoes was-773. The 
number of bills vetoed only represented 0.9 per cent 
of the total bills passed. 
2. Of the total number of bills vetoed between 1780-
1952, a high·percentage has been sustained. 
Eighty-six per~cent of bills vetoed failed to 
receive the two-thirds vote of the legislature which 
was necessary for their re-passage. 
3. The rate at which bills were vetoed w~s greater 
during years in which the party of the majority of 
the legislature was different from the party of the 
governor. Of the 159 years in which party relation-
ships were studied there were 122 years of party 
similarity. Of the 755 bills vetoed during the 159 
year period, ·6o pe:r> cent of them were vetoed during 
years of party similarity. This indicated that 
during party similarity bills were vetoed on an 
average of four bills a year. Forty per cent of bills 
vetoed occurred during years or party dissimilarity. 
This indicated that during party dissimilarity, bills 
were vetoed on an average of nine bills a year. It 
is evident therefore that although more bills were 
vetoed during years of similarity the rate of veto 
was greater during years of dissimilarity. 
4. The rate at which bills were passed over was greater 
during years in which the party of the majority of 
the legislature was different from the party of the 
governor. During the 159 years in which party 
relationships were studied, 101 vetoes were passed 
over. Of the number of vetoes passed over, 59 per 
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cent occurred during years of party dissimilarity. 
During years or party similarity bills were passed 
over at the rate or one bill per eleven vetoes, 
whereas during years of party dissimllarity, bills 
were passed over at the rate or 1 bill per rive 
vetoes. Thus the r~te at which bills were passed 
over during years of party dissimilarity was 
greater than during party .similarity. 
5. The reason most often used to justify vetoes was 
that o£ policy, and in the order or their 
rrequency or use the other grounds most often 
m ed were unnecessary, unconstitutional, and 
defective. 
6. Since 1860, the pocket veto has been utilized only 
seven times. The tendency has been fer the 
legislature to avoid the inevitable defeat of its 
bills. 
7. Governors of Massachusetts have round little need 
to revise appropriation bills because in effect 
the governor's budget becomes the basis for the 
general appropriation bill. Vetoes and reductions 
occur most often when legislatures attempt to 
increase eXpenditures above the level which the 
governor considers advisable. 
In general, the veto power has been wielded very little 
in Massa~husetts. Although the Constitution provides for a 
strong veto power, obviously other methods have been found 
to gain acceptance of and control-over policy. 
In recent years governors have found that it can be 
just as effective to appeal to public opinion as it is to 
appeal for legislative support. Where legislators may not 
be coerced by a governor's threat, it is unlikely that they 
can w~thstand the pressure from the polls. 
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APPENDIX A 
CHARTER ~ CONSTITUTIONAL. PROVISIONS 
ah~ter Provisions 
The law of 1644 providing for the separation of the 
GeiieraJ. Court into two co-equal Houses, taken .from Ancient 
Charters· & Laws of Massachusetts-Bay:_, Chapter 31, sec. 2, 
PP• 88-89. . · 
Forasmnch as after long experience, divers 
inconveniences are found in the manner of proceeding in this court, by magistrates and deputies sitting 
together; it is therefore ordered by this court 
authority·thereof, that henceforth the magistrates 
sit apart, and act all business belonging to this 
court,·by·themselves; by_drawing up bills and 
orders •••• they may present to the deputies to be 
considered and accordingly, to give their consent or 
dissent;· the·· deputies· in like manner sitting by them.;. 
selves·, and consulting about such orders and laws •••• 
which agreed on by them, they may present to the 
magistrates, who having considered thereof, may 
manifest their·consent or dissent thereto: 
· - · -And no ·raw, order or sentence shall pass, or be 
a.c·cotlrited- an act of this court, without consent of the 
greater· part of the magistrates on the one party, and 
the greater !lumber· of deputies on the other party; but 
all orders and conclusions that have passed by 
approbation of magistrates and deputies as. aforesaid, 
shall-be accounted acts of this court and accordingly 
be engrossed which on the day of the last session shall 
be deliberately read over before the whole court; pro-
vided that if the magistrates and deputies shall happen 
to differ in any case of judicature, either Civil or 
Criminal, such case shall be deter~ned by the major 
vote of the whole court met together. 
$3 
A provision within the Charter of 169l.granting to the 
Royal Governor of' Massachusetts the right o:r absolute veto 
ove:t' legislation and elections by the General Assembly and 
Ootincil; tram uThe Second Royu Charter of' the Oolony of 
the Massachusetts-Bay in North Atn.erica" in Robert Wilks, 
Occasional Essays on Various Sub.1ects. 
Provided· al.ways and we do, by these presents, ·.:for 
us, our heirs, and successors establish and.ordain; 
that· in the :framing and passing of' all such orders, 
laws·, statutes, and ordinances, and in all elections 
and acts of government whatsoever,·to _be passed; made, 
or done~ by the said General.. Court, or Assembly, or 
Council, the·· Governor of' our said province, or territory, 
of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England, for the time 
being, shall have the negative voice; and that without 
bis·consent or approbation, signified and declared in· 
writing, no such orders, laws, statutes, ordinances 
elections, or other acts·o:r·government whatsoever, to 
be made; passed, or done, by the said General Assembly 
or in .Council, shall be o:f any :Coree, e:ff'ect or 
validity; · anything herein contained to the contrary 
in any wise notwithstanding. 
·-·-~~ 
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Constitutional Provisions 
·Art. II, sec. I, eh. 1, of the Massachusetts Constitution 
adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1780 providing 
the Governo~ with a li~ted veto over legislation. 
No bill· or resolve of the senate or house of 
representatives· shall become a law, and have force as 
such~ until it shall have been r·aid.before the·governor 
for his·revisal; and if he, upon such revision, approve 
thereof', ·he shall signif'y his approbation by sigrdng · 
the same. But if' he have any objection to the passing 
of'- such bill or resolve; he shall return the same, 
together with his objections thereto, ;ln writing to the 
senate or house of' representatives, in whichsoever the 
same shall hAve originated; who·sball enter the objec-
tions sent down by the gover.m.or, at large, on their 
records; andproceed to .reconsider the said· bill or 
resolve. But ~ after such reconsideration, two-thirds 
o:r the said senate ,or· hou,se o:r·representatives, shall 
notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the 
same, it shall, together with the objections be sent to 
the other branch o:r the legislature, where it shall also 
be reconsidered; and if' approved by two-thirds of the 
members present, shall have the f'orce o:r a law; but in 
all such cases, the votes o:f both houses shall be 
determined· by yea·s a:nd· nays; and the names o:f the persons 
voting f'or, or agai.nst, the said bill or resolve, shall 
be entered upon the public records o:r the commonwealth. 
And in order to prevent unnecessary delays, i:f any 
bill or resolve shall not be returned by the governor 
within :rive days after it shall have·been presented, 
the same shall have the force of law. 
. . ' . ~· !" · .. ·' 
Art~ I of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution providing the Governor with the right ·to 
exercise a ttpocket veto". 
If any bill or resolve shall be objected to, 
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and not approved by the governor; 81 d j;ft' the general 
court shill adjourn within five days after the same 
shall have been laid before the governor for his 
approbation,'· and thereby prevent his returning it with 
his objections, as provided by the Constitution, such 
bill or-resolve shall not bec0me a law, nor have force 
as such. 
· ·- Art~ LVI of the Amendnients to the ·Massachusetts 
Constitution, ·adopted -by the Constitutional Convention of 
1917,:Providing the Governor-the right to return bills with 
recommendations for amendment. 
. . .. 
The governor, within five days after any bill or 
resolve·· shall have been laid before him, shall have the 
right- to retu.rn· it ·to the branch of the general court 
rn.-whichit originated with a recommendation that any 
amendment or a.mendment·s specil'ied by him be made~therein. 
·such bill or resolve is re-enacted in any form it shall 
again be laid before the governor for his action, but he 
Bhall have no right to return the same a second time with 
a recommendation to amend. 
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APPENDIX B 
NUMBER OF BILLS PASSED, VETOED AND SUSTAINED 
.. 1780-1952 . . . 
Bills Passed vetoes 
Year Bills Vetoed Sustained 
Acts Resolves Total 
1,80 3 119 122 -! ~~ 5a l58 ~86 £ j 
1783 59 332 391 
l784 80 413 493 
1785 82 469 551 2 2 
1786 126 ~g 436 178~ 70 518 1 1 178 59 332 391 
1789 K~ 298 372 1790 306 353 
1791 49 274 323 1 J. 
1792 78 284 362 1 1 • 1793 ~' 329 414 1 1 1794 255 329 2 1 1795 72 199 271 1 1 1796 89 21J. 300 1 
179~ 95 1t7 ~-179 83 1 3 1 
1799 84 16t 248 1800 133 16 299 1801 65 166 231 1802 96 i~~ 240 1803 169 324 1804 1~ 138 279 1805 12~ 134 258 1 1 1806 11 148 266 1 1 1807 138 161 299 2 
-1808 119 166 285 6 6 1809 113 131 . 244 1810 117 153 270 1811 190. 182 372 
• (continued on next page ) 
----------------~-------------l 
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(continued) 
, Bills Passed Year Vetoes 
Acts Resolves Total Bills Vetoed Sustained 
1812 164 205 369 
1813 147 -168 315 
1814 206 214 420 
1815 139 173 312 
1816 222 295 517 181~ 57 69 126 181 169 122 291 
1819 159 226 385 1820 133 107 240 
1821 85 59 iW6 1822 103 83 
1823 138 51- 189 1824 llLO 80 220 
1825 169 101 270 1826 167 86 253 
1827 129 90 219 2 2 1828 148 84 232 ... 1829 138 70 208 
1830 118 87 205 1 1 1831 206 100 306 l 1 1832 170 86 256 
-1833 222 75 297 2 2 1834 203 82 285 
1835 155 111 266 
1836 284 94 378 1837 245 98 343 1 1 1838 196 89 285 1839 166 92 258 
-
-1840 97 63 160 4 4 1841 132 66 198 1842 102 92 194 1843 100 80 180 
1844 178 121 299 1845 254 132 386 1846 2~1 147 %~ 1847 2 2 103 1848 332 87 419 1849 248 120 368 
• 
1850 319 111 430 1851 348 93 441 2 2 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
• 
Bills Passed 
Year Vetoes 
Acts Resolves Total Bills Vetoed Sustained 
1852 322 108 430 3 2 
1853 422 99 521 
1854 453 86 539 
1855 489 89 578 3 2 
1856 310 103 413 1 1 
1857 311 110 421 4 3 1858 177 44 221 
1859 274 105 379 2 2 
1860 213 84 297 ~ ~ 186J.. 208 105 313 J..862 226 11.7 343 3 2 1863 250 100 350 
1864 315 108 423 J.. 
.1865 285 76 361 2 2 
1866 301 105 406 
1867 359 93 452 
-1868 355 77 432 5 3 
1869 466 103 509 
1870 409 87 496 2 2 
1871 399 95 494 2 2 1872 360 68 428 
J..873 378 67 fri~ 1 1 1874 409 86 3 3 1875 293 78 371 
1876 247 57 304 2 2 
1877 252 69 321 3 3 1878 384 48 432 
1879 307 53 360 1 1 1880 262 68 330 
1881 305 71 376 1 1 
1882 274 61 335 1 1 
1883 279 54 333 13 12 
188~ 335 81 416 3 1 188 388 81 469 1 1 
1886 356 87 443 2 1 
1887· 452 108 560 2 1 
1888 444 104 548 1 1 
1889 473 112 585 
-
1890 . 456 79 535 1 1 
1891 431 11.8 549 2 2 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
Bills Passed Vetoes 
Year Bills Vetoed Sustained 
Acts ·Resolves Tota1 
1892 440 106 546 7 7 
1893 481 113 594 2 2 
189~ 550 111 661 1~ 4 189 509 127 636 13 
1896 550 12% 67% 3 3 1897 530 9 62 6 6 
1898 5Bo ll9 699 3 3 
1899 481 103 584 3 3 
1900 1+79 108 58~ 9 9 1901 ~~ 116 ~45 6 6 1902 130 1. 1 190i 58 104 5~9 14 14 190 460 110 §~g. 15 14 190' ~80 108 4 3 1906 36 109 645 ~ ~ 190~ ~r 1l3 A2o 190 5 J 1'7 6g~ ll 11 1909 i't% 6 6 1910 6~9 819 4 i 1911 7 7 158 905 17 
1912 725 .148 873 18 9 
1913 831 13.3 964 32 22 
1914 z96 160 956 _lt ~-1915 88 rtr 8~ 1916 681 8 5 16 15 
1917 721 135 856 8 8 
1918 i82 90 572 '2 2 1919 06 70 676 6 5 
1920 629 85 714 3 3 
1921 499 56 555 6 6 
1922 545 55 600 9 9 
1923 492 74 566 5 5 
1924 508 70 578 7 
1K 1925 347 40 ~l 14 1926 392 54 11i 12 
1927 333 i8 381 25 20 1928 396 2 458 25 18 
1929 ~t 56 440 2 1 e 1930 69 495 10 10 1931 460 67 527 ll 10 
1932 304 53 351 ' 13 l.O 
(concluded on next page) 
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(concluded) 
B1.lls Passed Vetoes . 
Year Bills Vetoed Sustained 
Acts Resolves ~otal. 
193~ 3~4 ~ ~~ 20 13 193 l9t -21 15 1935 551 ~ 12 1936 m ~i 507 11 193~ 520 26 24 193 501 91 592 25 25 
1939 517 74 591 23 23 
1940 No session of· 
the General 
Court 
194J. 729 
1942 No session of 
96 825 27 27 
the General 
Court 
19~3 570 72 642 26 23 
1944 No session of 
the General 
Colll't 
1945" 736 90 826 13 13 
1946 617 94 711 8 8 
194Z 683 79 762 18 16 
194 669 95 764 17 17 
1949 810 81 891 1 1 
1950. 829 ~~ 913 3 3 1951 809 895 2 2 
1952 635 108 743 3 3 
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APPENDIX 0 
LIST SHOWING PARTY AFFILIATION OF GOVERNOR ANFl 
MAJORITY PARTY OF LEGISLATURE, NUMBER OF BILLS 
VETOED, AND VETOES PASSED OVER* 
Governor's Majority Bills Vetc;>es 
Year Gar ernor Party Party ot: Vetoed Passed 
£.egiS~~ Over 
ture 
'1794 s~ Ad.e.mB anti-Fed. Federalist 2 1 
1795 s; Adams anti-Fed~ Federalist 1 1 
1796 s~ Adams anti-Fed. Federalist 1 1 
1797 I~ Sumner Federalist Federalist 
-
... 
1798 I~ Sumner Fede:raJ.ist Federalist 1 1 
1799 I. Sumner Federalist Federalist 
1800 c~ Strong Federalist Federalist 
1801 c~ Strong Federalist Federalist 
1802 c. Strong Federalist Federalist 
180~ c. Strong Federalist Federal.ist 180 c. Strong Federalist Federalist 
180. c~ Strong Federalist Federalist 1 ... 
1806 c. Strong Federalist Republican 1 1 
1807 J~ Sullivan Republican Republican 2 2 
1808 J~ Sullivan Republican Republican 6 .. .• 
1809 c. Gore Republican Federalist 
1810 E. Gerry Republican Fedel'"alist 
1811 E~ Gerry Republican Republican 
-1812 c. Strong Federalist Republican .. 
1813 c. Strong Federalist Federalist 
*Data t:or the years 1794-1858 were compiled from Vo1s. 3 
and 4 of Albert Bushnell Hart's Commonwealth History of 
Massachusett-!!,l3tates History Company, New York, 1927. The 
writer is indebted to the staff of the Massachusetts State 
Library for the data covering the remaining years, 1859-1952. 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
Governor's Majority Bills Vetoes 
Year Governor Party Party of Vetoed Passed 
Legisla- Over 
tur~ 
1814 c. Strong Federalist Federalist 
1815 c~ Strong Federalist Federalist 
1816 J~ Brooks Federalist .Federalist 
18lA J. Brooks Federalist ·Federal.ist 181 J. Brooks Federalist Federalist 
1819 J'. Brooks Federalist Federalist 
1820 J .. Brooks Federalist Federalist 
1821 J~ Brooks Federalist Federalist 
1822 J~ Brooks FederaJ.ist Federalist 
18&: w~ Eu.stis Republican Republican 18 w. Eustis Republican· Republican 
1825 L~ Lincoln National R~ · Republican 
1826 L. Lincoln National. R. Republican 
1827 L. Lincoln National R~ National R. 2 
1828 L: Lincoln National R~ National R. 
-1829 L~ Lincoln National R. National R; 
1830 L. Lincoln National R. National. R~ 1 
1831 L; Lincoln National R; National R~ 1 
1832 L~ Lincoln National R~ National R. 
1833 L~ Lincoln National R~ . National. R~ 2 
1834 J~ Davis National R~ National R. .. 
1835 J~ Davis National R. Whig 
1836 E~ Everett Whig Whig 
1837 E~ Everett Whig Whig 1 
i838 E. Everett Whig Whig 
1839 E~ Everett Whig 'Whig .... 
1840 M. Morton Democrat Whig 4 
1841 J~ Davis Whig Whig 
1842 J. Davis Whig Whig 
1843 M. Morton Democrat Whig 
1844 G. Bx-iggs Whig Whig 
1845 G~ Briggs Whig Whig 
1846 G~ Briggs Whig Whig 
1847 G. Briggs Whig Whig 
1848 G~ B!tiggs Whig Whig 
1.84.9 G. Briggs Whig Whig 
-1850 G. Briggs Whig Whig 
1851 G. Boutwell Democrat Democrat 2 
-
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
Governor's Majarity Bills Bills 
Year Governor Party Party of Vetoed Passed 
Legisla- Over 
ture 
1852 G~ Boutwell Democrat Whig 3 1 
185.3 J~ Clifford Whig Whig 
1854 E~ Washburn Know-Notbing Know-Nothing 
-1855 H~ Gardner Know-Nothing Know-Nothing 3 1 
1856 H~ Gardner Know-Nothing Know-Nothing 1 
1857 R~ Gardner Know-Nothing Know-Nothing 1 
1858 II~ Garditer Kn.ow-.Nothing Know-Nothing 4 1 
1859 N~ Ba.riks Republican Repub1ican ~ 1860 N; Banks· Republican Republican 1861 J~ Andrew Republican Republic·an 
1862 J~ Andrew Republican Republican 3 1 
1863 J~ Andrew Republican Republican 
1864 J~ Andrew Republican Republican l. 1 
1865 J~ Andrew Repub1ican Republican 2 
1866 A~ Bullock Repub1ican Republican 
1867 A; Bullock Republican Republican 
-1868 A~ Bul1ock Repub11can Republican 5 2 
1869 w~ Claflin Republican Republican 
1870 w~ Claflin Republican Republican 2 
1871 w. Olaf1in Republican Republican 2 
1872 w~ Washburn Republican Republican 
1873 w. Washburn Republican Republican 1 
1874 w. Washburn Republican Republican 3 
1875 w~ Gaston Democrat Republican 
1876 A~ Rice Republican Republican 2 
1877 A~ Rice Republican Republican 3 
1878 A~ Rice Republican Republican 
1879 T~ Talbot Republican Republican 1 
1880 J~ Long Republican Republican 
1881 J~ Long Republican Republican 1 
1882 J~ Long Republican Republican 1 
1883 ~ Butler Democratic Bepublican 13 1 
1884 G~ Robinson Republican Republican 3 2 
1885 G~ Robinson Republican Republican 1 
1886 G; Robinson Republican Republican 2 1 
1887 o; Aimes Republican Republican 2 1 
1888 0.; Aimes Republic an Republican 1 
'-
1889 o. Aimes Republican Republican 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued) 
Year 
18~-o . 
1891· 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904. 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
191.3 
1914 
1915· 
1916 
191~ 191 
1919 
1920 
1921. 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
Governor 
Governor's 
Party 
J~ Brackett Republican 
w~ Ru.sse11 Democrat 
w~ Russell. Demoer·at 
w~ Russell Democrat 
F~ Greenb'alge Republican 
F~ Greenbalge Republican 
F~ GreenbaJ.ge Republican 
R~ Wolcott Republican 
R~ Wolcott Republican 
R; Wolcott RepubJ.iean 
w~ Crane Republican 
w~ Crane Republican 
w~ Crane Republican-
;r; Bates Republican 
;r. Bates Repub11ean 
w~ Douglas Democrat 
a; Guild~ Jr~ Republican 
c. Guild~ Jr~ Republican 
c~ Guild, Jr., Republican 
E; Draper Republican 
E~ Draper Repub1ican 
E~ Foss Democl:'at 
E~ Foss Democrat 
E~ Foss Democrat 
D~ WaJ.sh Democrat 
D~. Walsh Democrat 
s~ McCall Republican 
s~ McCaJ.J. Repub1ican 
s~ Me Gall Repub1ican 
c. Coolidge Republ.ican 
a~ Coolidge Republ.ican c. Cox Republ.iean 
e~ Cox Republican 
c~ Cox Republican 
c. Cox Republican 
A. Ful.1er Repub1iean 
A. Fu.l1er Republ.ican 
A., Ful.ler Republican 
Majority 
Party of 
Legisla-
ture 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republic an 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Repub1iean 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
(concluded on next page 1 . 
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Bills Bills 
Vetoed.Passed 
Over 
1 
2 
7 
2 
1~ 
3 
6 
3 
3 
9 
6 
l. 
14 
1~ 
7 
8 
ll 
6 
4 
iA 
32 
~ 
16 
8 
2 
6 
3 
6 
9 
5 
7 
14 
11+ 25 
-5 
-
1 
1 
-
-
9 
9 
10 
1 
1 
2 
5 
• 
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(concluded) 
Governor ts Majority Bills Bills 
Year Governor Party ;party o:f Vetoed Passed 
Legisla- Over 
ture 
1928 A. Fuller Republican Republican 25 7 
1929 F. Allen Republican Republican 2 1 
1930 F. Allen Republican Republican 16' 
1931 J". Ely Democrat Republican 11 1 
1932 J. Ely Democrat Republican 12 3 
1933 J. Ely Democrat Republican 20 7 
193~ J. Ely Democrat Republican 21 6 193- J". Gurley Democrat Republican ii 2 1936 J". Gurley Democrat Republican 5 
1937 c. Hurley Democrat Republican 26 2 
1938 c. Hurley Democrat Republican 25 
1939 L. S.al tons tall Republican Republican 23 
1940 L. Saltonstall Republican Republican 
1941 L. Saltonstall Republican Republican 27 
1942 L. Saltonstall Republican Republican 
1943 L. Saltonstall Republican Republican 26 3 
1941+ L. Saltonstall Republican Republican 
1945 M. Tobin Democrat Republican 13 
1946 M. Tobin Democrat Republican 8 
1947 R. Brad:ford Republican Republican 18 2 
1948 R. Brad:ford Republican Republican 17 
1949 P. Dever Democrat ·· No Maj ori ty-l~ 1 
1950 P. Dever Democrat No Majority 3 
1951 P. Dever Democrat Republican 2 
1952 P. Dever Democrat Republican 3 
~Lmring the years 1949-50, although the Democrats held 
a majorfty in the House o:f Representatives, the Senate was 
split 20-20. During the years 1951-52, although the 
Democrats controlled the House, the Republicans held a 22-18 
ma3ority in the Senate. 
r 
APPENDIX D 
FIRST VETO MESSAGE 
Delivered by John Hancock, March 9, 1781 to the 
General Court 
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Gentlemen of the Senate and Gentlemen of the House of Repre-
sentatives: 
It is my wish at all times to carry into execution 
the Resolves of the Gene~al Court with such dispatch as 
wil'l effect the purposesdesigned and in consequence of 
your despatch of February 9, was using every possible 
means to furnish ana- forward the supplies ordered for the 
Eastern Department many of which are now ready, but not-
Withstanding every exertion there will be a deficiency 
even in the execution of that part of the supplies. 
The Resolves of the General Court of March 6, Instant 
'include a requiai tion for a supply of articles for the 
a~e department more extensive than the for.mer, which 
if designed as an·addition to the first and to be 
~ediately furnished will certainly fail in the 
execution. Not tbree:..nundred firearms are in the public 
stores of the Commonwealth. I have sent to the Commis-
sary of Military Stores to know what of the articles he 
can supply; he returns me for answer he can only at:t:ord 
the s'lipply ofpowder. The means proposed by the 
Res.ol ve are not ad~quate to the purchase of.' the 
deficient articles. I cannot therefore sign the Resolves 
without the further interposition of the General Court, 
lest I fihouJ.d.,be made accountable and censurable when 
wholly out of my power to carry the_ Resolves into execu-
tion1 although :mu.ch disposed to exert myself for the-
welfare and sa:t:ety of every part of the Commonwealth. 
I must request the General Court to give some explanation 
of their intentions as to the immediate supply or the 
several articles for- the Eastern Department and if the 
whole warlike stores, cannons, and other provisions 
mentioned in the Resolves of February 9, and March 6 are 
to be procured-that further means may be provided for the 
obtaining them. T.he several Resolves respecting the 
Militia I will endeavor to carry into execution, but I must 
beg leave to request the attention of the General Court __ 
97 
to that which requests the Continental Troops in 
the three Eastern Counties gnd the impropriety of my 
interfering in the officering or arranging of those 
troops. ··-If'· the whole· supply of Provisions is to be 
made; I shall be obliged to send to Mr. Baker for one 
hti.ndred barrels of Pork, under his care gnd appro-
priated for another purpose. T.he disappointment to the 
Ar!r.a:y and the change of land and water transportation, 
I submit to the General Court. 
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